A Usage for Shared Resources in RELOAD (ShaRe)

draft-knauf-p2psip-share-00

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Outline

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Problem Statement

Why do we need Shared Resources in RELOAD?

- Standard access control mechanisms are not sufficient for controlled write access by multiple peers
- Simplest way: USER-MATCH policy and certificate with same user name for all peers
 - Need to contact enrollment server \rightarrow infeasible
 - Need to distribute private key/secrets/certificate
 - No individual revocation
- Use cases:
 - conference registration, message board, SSM source announcement, ...

Objectives

- Single resource to be writable by a well defined group of peers
 - Without contacting enrollment server
 - Allow revocation
- Optionally: more relaxed resource naming scheme

Define some primitives for other Usages to build upon

Shared Resources - Overview

- RELOAD Resource (Kind) for which multiple peers have write access
- Resource Owner: has access by some (standard) policy (e.g., USER-MATCH)
- Resource Owner grants access using an Access Control List (ACL)
- ACL is stored under the same Resource-ID

 \rightarrow on the same peer

• Write permission may be further delegated

 \rightarrow Chain of delegations in ACL

Access Control Policies

- For the Owner:
 - Standard policy (e.g., USER-MATCH)
 - or relaxation thereof: USER-PATTERN-MATCH
 - Allows the Owner to store the ACL
- For other peers:
 - USER-CHAIN-ACL
- Enforced by the storing peer, but independently verifiable

Access Control List

- Stored under the same Resource Name as the Shared Resource
- Contains delegations from _user \rightarrow to _user
- Users in the ACL may write the Shared Resource
- Chain of signed delegations may be independently verified
 struct { opaque resource_name<0..2^16-1>;
 - KindId kind;
 opaque from_user<0..2^16-1>;
 opaque to_user<0..2^16-1>;
 - Boolean allow_delegation;
 - } AccessListData;

Revocation of Write Permission

Revocation is simple:

- Invalidate corresponding delegation in ACL
 - set exists=false
- Succeeding delegations also invalidated
- Owner can revoke the whole list by deleting the root entry

Access Control List – Example

++ Access List +++		
++	Array Entries	Signature
	Kind:1234 from:Owner -> to:Owner ad:1	
	Kind:1234 from:Owner -> to:Alice ad:1	
2	Kind:1234 from:Alice -> to:Bob ad:0	signed by Alice
	•••	•••
42	Kind:4321 from:Owner -> to:Owner ad:1	signed by Owner
	<pre>Kind:4321 from:Owner -> to:Carol ad:0</pre>	I I
++	···	···· +

Requirements for Using Shared Resources

- Separated Data Storage
 - Each element MUST be exclusively maintained by its creator

→ Kind MUST use a RELOAD data model consisting of individual objects (e.g. array or dictionary)

- Access Control Policy
 - Usage MUST permit the USER-CHAIN-ACL policy
- user_name field
 - Kind data structure MUST contain the user_name field

Variable Resource Names

• Extends the set of allowed Resource Names for a peer with a given user name

 \rightarrow Relaxation of USER-MATCH policy

- Resource Names still closely related to Owner's user name
- Regular expression defines the allowed Resource Names for a Kind in the configuration document:

```
<variable-resource-names>
   <pattern kind="DISCO-REGISTRATION">
    .*-conf-$USER@$DOMAIN
   </pattern>
</variable-resource-names>
```

Conclusion & Outlook

- Defined primitives to allow coordinated shared writing of a RELOAD resource
- Defined a relaxed resource naming scheme

- Now we need some drafts using these primitives ;-) (see draft-knauf-p2psip-disco-02)
- Use CGIs as an additional option for resource names
- Next version could use ECMAScript to define access policies as in draft-petithuguenin-p2psip-access-control

Thank you for your attention!

Any Questions?