

`draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf-01`

Configuration of pro-active MPLS-TP Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) Functions Using LSP Ping

E. Bellagamba,	Ericsson
P. Sköldström,	Acreo
D. Ward,	Juniper
J. Drake,	Juniper
L. Andersson,	Ericsson

Overview

OBJECTIVE

To specify the mechanisms necessary to establish MPLS-TP OAM entities monitoring an LSP and define information elements and procedures to configure pro-active MPLS OAM functions.

Configuration via LSP-PING of:

- › *BFD CC and CV*
- › *Performance Monitoring Loss* as specified in **draft-frost-mpls-tp-loss-delay**
- › *Performance Monitoring Delay* as specified in **draft-frost-mpls-tp-loss-delay**
- › *Fault Management Signal*


Previous
Version

Changes respect to the previous version

- › Adopted as WG document
- › Previously the TLV structure sections were referring to ***draft-ietf-ccamp-rsvp-te-mpls-tp-oam-ext***
- › The TLV structure is still aligned with ***draft-ietf-ccamp-rsvp-te-mpls-tp-oam-ext*** but is redefined here as well because of:
 - different “length” value usage in the TLV defined by CCAMP respect to MPLS (include/do not include TLV header in length)
 - different “type” value respect to CCAMP
- › Added the ***Integrity flag***
- › Added ***BFD Authentication sub-TLV***

Integrity Flag


- › When BFD Control packets are transported in the G-ACh they are not protected by any end-to-end checksum.
- › A single bit error, e.g. a flipped bit in the BFD State field could cause the receiving end to wrongly conclude that the link is down and thus trigger protection switching.
- › To prevent this from happening the "BFD Configuration sub-TLV" has an Integrity flag that when set enables BFD Authentication using Keyed SHA1 with an empty key (all 0s) [[RFC5880](#)]. This would make every BFD Control packet carry an SHA1 hash of itself that can be used to detect errors.




BFD Authentication sub-TLV

If BFD Authentication using a shared key / password is desired the "***BFD Authentication sub-TLV***" MUST be included in the "BFD Configuration sub-TLV".

How the key exchange is performed is out of scope of this document.



- Auth Type: indicates which type of authentication to use. The same values as defined in [section 4.1 of \[RFC5880\]](#) are used.
- Auth Key ID: indicates which authentication key or password (depending on Auth Type) should be used.



optional *Authentication Section*

BFD Control Packet Format

Next Steps

- › Work in parallel with work done in MPLS-TP
 - for example including the throughput measurements configuration

- › Keep these three drafts aligned
 - draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-mpls-tp-oam-conf-01
 - draft-ietf-ccamp-rsvp-te-mpls-tp-oam-ext-05
 - draft-zhang-mpls-tp-pw-oam-config-04 (configuration for PW)

- › Receive more comments from the Working Groups