

NSEC3 Update

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NSEC3

– **Latest version:**

- `http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-dnsext-nsec3-03.txt`

Issue #1

- Signalling
 - Should NSEC3 be signalled to NSEC3-unaware DNSSEC implementations? I.e. does an NSEC3 zone look bogus or insecure to an unaware resolver?
 - We have no strong opinion – there is an independent transition mechanisms I-D. We will use whatever the WG prefers.

Issue #2

- NSEC3 Transition
 - Is it a requirement that a transition from NSEC to NSEC3 have no period of insecurity?
 - Consensus on list was “no”

Issue #3

- Base 32 encoded sort order was different to binary sort order.
 - Fixed in –03
 - Using RFC 2932 base 32 encoding which preserves sort order

Issue #4

- Hashes create new owner names in a zone – is this a problem?
 - Believe consensus is “no”

Issue #5

- What if a hash and a “real” owner name collide?
 - Believe this is okay
 - No problem having other RR types where there’s an NSEC3

Issue #6

- Potential DoS on resolvers
 - Evil server chooses very high number of iterations
 - We will allow resolvers to set an upper limit for iterations and treat higher numbers as bogus.

Issue #7

- How do secondaries know the NSEC3 parameters?
 - Any parameter set present at the apex will be present in the whole zone

Issue #8

- Rationale
 - Draft needs to include more information about rationale behind design decisions, e.g.
 - Why have a salt?
 - Why have iterations?
 - This will be in the next version

Issue #9

- Hash algorithm field is 7 bits – we should share the DS hash algorithm registry which is 8 bits
 - Will be fixed in next version

Issue tracker

Will be available shortly at:

- <http://nsec3.nominet.org.uk/>
- Will be announced on list

Finish

- Questions?