Last Modified: 2005-06-27
| Done | Discuss initial geopriv scenarios and application requirements i-d's | |
| Done | Discuss initial geographic location privacy and security requirements i-d. | |
| Done | Initial i-d on geographic information protocol design, including privacy and security techniques. | |
| Done | Review charter and initial i-ds with AD, and have IESG consider rechartering if necessary. | |
| Done | Submit geopriv scenarios and application requirements to IESG for publicaiton as Informational RFCs | |
| Done | Submit security/privacy requirements I-D to IESG for publication as Informational RFC. | |
| Done | Submit PIDF-LO basic geopriv object draft as a PS | |
| Done | Initial Common Rules base object draft | |
| Done | Initial Common Ruels GEOPRIV object draft | |
| Done | Submit DHCP Civil draft as a PS | |
| Feb 05 | Initial bis-requirements document | |
| Feb 05 | Confer with SIP WG on SIP using protocol draft as PS | |
| Feb 05 | Submit draft-ietf-geopriv-policy as PS | |
| Feb 05 | Submit draft-ietf-geopriv-common-policy as PS | |
| Mar 05 | Close or re-charter for GEOPRIV-MAINT | |
| Mar 05 | Submit draft-ietf-geopriv-radius as PS |
| RFC | Status | Title |
|---|---|---|
| RFC3693 | I | Geopriv requirements |
| RFC3694 | I | Threat Analysis of the geopriv Protocol |
| RFC3825 | Standard | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Option for Coordinate-based Location Configuration Information |
| RFC4079 | I | A Presence Architecture for the Distribution of GEOPRIV Location Objects |
|
Minutes of the GEOPRIV Working Group at the 63nd IETF
----------------------------------------------------- Co-Chairs: Allison Mankin Randall Gellens Andrew Newton Minutes: Doug Otis
Andrew presented the agenda, and noted that two items had been added: a) GEOPRIV issues with SIP events, and b) draft-guenther-geopriv-saml-policy-01. No objection were given to the additions. Martin Thomson presented draft-winterbottom-location-uri-00. Martin discussed the benefits of passing location information by reference vs. passing location information by value. Henning Schulzrinne objected to the points that pass-by-reference had superior privacy strengths, and Jon Peterson pointed out that pass-by-reference has better access control features whereby pass-by-value is limited to the use of cryptography. Hannes Tschofenig disagreed with this point and noted that in both cases access control needs to be configured. Henning Schulzrinne and Jon Peterson also discussed the differences between cost and environmental challenges between pass-by-value and pass-by-reference. Many participants noted that the draft seemed more like propaganda against pass-by-value and requested that it either should be toned down or provide better supporting arguments. The draft authors agreed. Ted Hardie noted that any pass-by-reference model needs to specify the access methods for reference, with URIs the set of schemes need to be specified. Jon Peterson then noted that this draft was only intended to describe a concept and not a concrete proposal. Brian Rosen noted that the description of pass-by-value being used by anybody does not correctly describe the pass-by-value deployment environments where trust is put into the channel and channel connections, especially when channel security is utilized. Jon Peterson noted that pass-by-reference does not necessarily need to rely upon cryptography, whereby pass-by-value does require cryptography. Brian Rosen noted that in the emergency case that passwords were not plausible for deployment. Hannes Tshofenig presented draft-ietf-geopriv-pdif-lo-profile. Henning Schulzrinne noted that he did not see any productive outcome for continuing discussion on providing guidelines on precision or accuracy. He noted that he knew of no reasons why it would be dropped when it was given. Martin Thomson presented draft-winterbottom-http-location-delivery-01.txt. This document is known as HELD. John Schnizlein noted that HTTP has the capability of traversing NATs, but that HELD cannot because of its callback feature. Henning Schulzrinne noted that objects reference by HELD will have an object lifetime issue, at that at some point that a location object reference by HELD would be deleted. Martin Thomson suggested that retention requirements could be added but that they would vary depending on situation. Henning Schulzrinne expressed concern over variable retention requirements. Steve Norris also expressed concern for variable retention requirements. Hannes Tschofenig also stated that there was a state maintenance issue on top of the retention issue. Hannes Tschofenig stated that he did not understand the pseudonym in HELD and stated that there might be identity issues with HELD pseudonyms and the other identifiers in PIDF-LO. Ted Hardie stated that he believed that GEOPRIV does not currently have the policy rules defined for using On-Behalf-Of in HELD and that it would require a lot of work. John Schnizlein agreed and noted that On-Behalf-Of using IP addresses from the access networks will cause mistakes. John Schnizlein raised concerns four concerns: (a) reliance on "the" access network fails because there are often multiple ones - a tunnel for example (b) discovery using DNS unnecessarily relies on DHCP, then on a record not intended for the public use of DNS, (c) reliance on the domain returned by DHCP does not work either: e.g. the domain for the host in my hand is not here in France where the access is, and (d) the feasibility of generating a location from just an IP address is not clear. Martin Thomson mentioned that SLP could be used instead. Hannes Tschofenig led a facilitated discussion on the issues that came from the GEOPRIV/ECRIT interim meeting held in New York. John Schnizlein questioned the need to worry about wrong locaiton information in an emergency phone call. Steve Norris noted that it is quite common in certain jurisdictions to fake incidents that require police reaction just to give neighbors a bad reputation. Stuart Goldman noted that fake location information in an emergency call could be used by terrorists to dispatch first responders to the wrong location. Randy Gellens noted that it may be easier to trust location information from a SIP proxy than from a call originator, but sophisticated attackers can stand up a SIP proxy. Andrew Newton and John Schnizlein noted that emergency call takers usually ask callers for information in addition to what they get from the network. Rohan Mahy noted that once a cryptographic signature is placed over an identity, there is then an issue of coordinating identities with users and emergency call centers. Brian Rosen noted that PSAP operators want location information to be reliable and spoof protected, but that even if the location information is incorrect a PSAP will take a call. Correct location information may be usable for call routing in high load situations. He also noted that asserted location is more important than identity. Brian Rosen also noted that the access network and signaling network may be different, and therefore it is difficult to use the access network to control aspects of the signaling. And that the two networks have different identities. Hannes Tschofenig noted that the difference between the access network and the signaling network is an issue because many solutions do not take into account these differing network architectures. Ted Hardie noted that the question that needs to be asked is about the necessity of passing the location/identity binding from the access network through the signaling network and to the emergency call end point. Rohan Mahy asked how a PSAP distinguishes between a large number of legitimate calls and a denial-of-service attack. Henning Schulzrinne asked if it is helpful to provide better bindings between location and network characteristics. Such as, would the source IP address of the call help when the location passed in the call is not known to be in that location. Steve Norris stated that multiple pieces of information given to the PSAPs will be beneficial, and so it could be useful to provide PSAPs with both the information from a network element and a information from a client. Rohan Mahy presented draft-mahy-geopriv-sip-loc-pkg-01.txt. Henning Schulzrinne stated that the normal PIDF-LO model uses presence subscriptions and this draft does not use presence. Rohan asked about applications that do not need presence information. Jon Peterson answered that presence requests can be filtered. Rohan noted that doing presence requests requires domain knowledge in presence even though the application is in the location domain. James Polk noted that this document solves a problem that is difficult to do in the SIP location conveyance document. Martin Thomson also agreed that the document was useful but noted that some of the GML bindings needed to be tightened up. Rohan noted that the use of GML with PIDF-LO is one of the reasons why he believed this document should be in GEOPRIV. Randy Gellens noted that the privacy requirements about location change events may be harder than anticipated because users tend to have changing needs. Rohan answered the concern by stating that such complexity could be handled by user interfaces. Andrew asked for a hum from the room regarding GEOPRIV accepting the work in the draft on the filter formatting. The room accepted the work. Hannes Tschofenig gave a presentation on draft-guenther-geopriv-sampl-policy-01. Andrew asked how many participants had read the draft. Only two participants raised their hands. Andrew stated that the question of adopting this draft would have to be taken to the list since there were not enough reviewers of the draft in the room. |