

v6ops and security

IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security Considerations

draft-savola-v6ops-security-overview-00.txt

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Overview

Overview

- Look at different kinds of issues
 - IPv6 protocol
 - Transition mechanisms in general
 - Deployment
 - + general observations
- What should we do about it?
 - Very prominent in the charter, something needs to be done
 - An abstract approach
 - Which drafts would be applicable/which work should be initiated
 - Adopt some drafts / initiate some new work?

Different kinds of issues

Different kinds of issues (the IPv6 protocol suite)

□ Protocol itself (some generic, some more specific)

○ Some people afraid of increased end-to-end transparency

- ▷ people used to the NAT "security model"
- ▷ education required; need a mechanism to control access

○ Some people afraid of increased end-to-end encryption

- ▷ people used to the perimeter firewall "security model"
- ▷ due to key mgmt difficulties, may not be a huge problem
- ▷ highlights the need for end-host, distributed, managed firewalling

○ Issues in specifications

- ▷ how hosts should parse Routing Headers
- ▷ how privacy addresses' applicability is not clear
- ▷ how ICMPv6 messages may be generated in response to multicast packets
- ▷ how neighbor discovery "on-link" sending model causes complications
- ▷ etc.

Different kinds of issues

Different kinds of issues (transition)

□ Transition/Co-existence tools

○ Tunneling in general

- UDP tunneling typically punches through NATs *AND* firewalls; breaking assumptions
- configured IPv6-in-IPv4 tunneling slightly better (typically explicit allow/disallow)

○ Automatic tunneling mechanisms

- the risks of packet forgery and DoS attacks increase
- the virtual topologies, especially ad-hoc ones, make the network architecture more complex

○ Relay issues

- communication with third parties in automatic tunneling
- unless carefully done, increases the risk of DoS etc.

Different kinds of issues

Different kinds of issues (deployment)

□ Issues in deployment

○ Problems with IPv4/6 dual stack use

- certain cases of deployment may incur large timeouts (as presented)
- quality of IPv6 routing globally is inferior to IPv4: worse quality
- some applications don't handle all the fallbacks properly
- some DNS servers/load-balancers abuse AAAA-querying resolvers

○ Insecure service piloting

- testing services/applications without proper access controls

○ Operational factors in network infrastructure

- unstable(r) router software, causing virtual topologies or breaks for "production" v4
- slower processing (non-line-speed), causing hacks like MPLS
- missing features (e.g. no ability to turn off IPv6 telnet access)
- insecure default configuration/assumptions (if IPv4 access is restricted, IPv6 may be allowed by default unless explicitly disallowed)
- costs of running one protocol (multiple topologies) vs two protocols (double the processing)

Different kinds of issues

Different kinds of issues

□ Things to note in general

○ Prefer native IPv4/IPv6

- security issues greatly simplified

○ Accept configured tunneling

- plain and simple
- where necessary, try to avoid if possible
- explicit knowledge of the end-points: a lot fewer risks

○ Avoid automatic tunneling

- security properties typically difficult to handle
- usually bring on a lot of complexity
- may be difficult to retire ("sunset strategy")

What should we do?

What should we do about security?

- Charter lists a lot of items of IPv4/IPv6 operations
 - 1. solicit input on sec issues from operators/community
 - 2. provide feedback to IPv6 WG on specs which are likely to cause sec issues
 - 4. publish docs on security risks of the operations (w/ sec area)
 - 5. identify sec issues in deployment scenarios/solutions

- So..
 - We had better DO something!
 - Security is about the most important item on our charter

- But what to do?
 - Good question!
 - Feedback sought..

What should we do?

What should we do about security (generic)?

□ We need more security expertise

- To evaluate security aspects of the proposals from the first
- And to help in figuring out an answer to the all of below

□ We need better idea how to evaluate security

○ How to deal with issues transparency etc. imply?

- ▷ specify local access control mechanisms?
- ▷ try to see if there's work on end-host firewalling?

○ How to deal with issues NAT/firewall traversal imply?

- ▷ do we need to do more than what other NAT traversal mechanisms have done (=nothing)?
- ▷ probably yes, but what?

○ How to deal with the evaluation of transition mechanisms?

- ▷ how much complexity is "too much"?
- ▷ how much security is "enough"?

What should we do?

What should we do about security (concrete)?

□ Current drafts which could be applicable to this WG

- draft-dupont-ipv6-rfc3041harmful-02.txt
- draft-savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security-03.txt
- draft-savola-ipv6-rh-hosts-00.txt
- draft-cmetz-v6ops-v4mapped-api-harmful-00.txt +
draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-01.txt

- draft-bellovin-ipv6-accessprefix-01.txt +
draft-zill-ipv6wg-zone-prefixlen-00.txt

▷ something like this is very much in scope

- draft-savola-v6ops-6to4-security-02.txt
- draft-savola-v6ops-firewalling-01.txt
- draft-savola-v6ops-security-overview-00.txt

- draft-okazaki-v6ops-natpt-security-00.txt

What should we do?

What should we do about security (concrete)?

- Adopt some of the previous drafts?
 - Good candidates
 - ▷ draft-savola-v6ops-6to4-security-02.txt
 - ▷ draft-savola-v6ops-firewalling-01.txt
 - If not adapt, push for being worked on (security area? IPv6 wg?)
 - ▷ draft-bellovin-ipv6-accessprefix-01.txt or draft-zill-ipv6wg-zone-prefixlen-00.txt

- Should we start working on something new?
 - Bring in that security input from the ops/users community!
 - How to go about those issues in IPv6 specs?
 - Need to create two documents on security? **ARE** there issues to document?
 - ▷ (ch4): potential security risks in the operation of IPv4/IPv6?
 - ▷ (ch6): identify open sec issues with deployment scenarios?
 - If so, maybe need a small editorial team (or DT).