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2.6.7 Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) (pkix)

NOTE: This charter is a snapshot of the 55th IETF Meeting in Altanta, Georgia USA. It may now be out-of-date.

Last Modifield: 05/20/2002

Chair(s):
Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
Tim Polk <wpolk@nist.gov>
Security Area Director(s):
Jeffrey Schiller <jis@mit.edu>
Steve Bellovin <smb@research.att.com>
Security Area Advisor:
Jeffrey Schiller <jis@mit.edu>
Mailing Lists:
General Discussion: ietf-pkix@imc.org
To Subscribe: ietf-pkix-request@imc.org
In Body: subscribe (In Body)
Archive: http://www.imc.org/ietf-pkix
Description of Working Group:
The PKIX Working Group was established in the Fall of 1995 with the intent of developing Internet standards needed to support an X.509-based PKI. The scope of PKIX work has expanded beyond this initial goal. PKIX not only profiles ITU PKI standards, but also develops new standards apropos to the use of X.509-based PKIs in the Internet.

PKIX has produced several informational and standards track documents in support of the original and revised scope of the WG. The first of these standards, RFC 2459, profiled X.509 version 3 certificates and version 2 CRLs for use in the Internet. Profiles for the use of Attribute Certificates (RFC XXXX [pending]), LDAP v2 for certificate and CRL storage (RFC 2587), the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile (RFC 3039), and the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and certification Practices Framework (RFC 2527 - Informational) are in line with the initial scope.

The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) (RFC 2510), the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) (RFC 2560), Certificate Management Request Format (CRMF) (RFC 2511), Time-Stamp Protocol (RFC 3161), Certificate Management Messages over CMS (RFC 2797), Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocols (RFC 3161), and the use of FTP and HTTP for transport of PKI operations (RFC 2585) are representative of the expanded scope of PKIX, as these are new protocols developed in the working group, not profiles of ITU PKI standards.

A roadmap, providing a guide to the growing set of PKIX document, also has been developed as an informational RFC.

Ongoing PKIX Work items

An ongoing PKIX task is the progression of existing, standards track RFCs from PROPOSED to DRAFT. Also, to the extent that PKIX work relates to protocols from other areas, e.g., LDAP, it is necessary to track the evolution of the other protocols and produce updated RFCs. For example, the LDAP v2 documents from PKIX are evolving to address LDAP v3. Finally, since the profiling of X.509 standards for use in the Internet remains a major focus, the WG will continue to track the evolution of these standards and incorporate changes and additions as appropriate.

New Work items for PKIX

- production of a requirements RFC for delegated path discovery and path validation protocols (DPD/DPV) and subsequent production of RFCs for protocols that satisfy the requirements

- development of a logotype extension for certificates

- development of a proxy certificate extension and associated processing rules

- development of an informational document on PKI disaster recovery

These work items may become standards track, INFORMATIONAL or EXPERIMENTAL RFCs, or may not even be published as RFCs.

Other deliverables may be agreed upon as extensions are proposed. New deliverables must be approved by the Security Area Directors before inclusion on the charter or IETF meeting agendas.

Goals and Milestones:
Done  Complete approval of CMC, and qualified certificates documents
Done  Complete time stamping document
Done  Complete data certification document
Done  Continue attribute certificate profile work
Done  Complete work on attribute certificate profile
Done  Standard RFCs for public key and attribute certificate profiles, CMP, OCSP, CMC, CRMF, TSP, Qualified Certificates, LDAP v2 schema, use of FTP/HTTP, Diffie-Hellman POP
Done  Production of revised certificate and CRL syntax and processing RFC (son-of-2459)
Done  INFORMATIONAL RFCs for X.509 PKI policies and practices, use of KEA
Done  Experimental RFC for Data Validation and Certification Server Protocols
MAR 02  Logotype Extension RFC
MAR 02  Proxy Certificate RFC
APR 02  Progression of CRMF, CMP, and CMP Transport to DRAFT Standard
APR 02  Production of revised CMC RFCs (updates and split of CMC into several parts)
APR 02  DPD/DVP Requirements RFC
APR 02  DPV/DPD Protocols WG last call
JUL 02  Progression of CMC RFCs to DRAFT Standard
DEC 02  DPV/DPD RFC(s)
Internet-Drafts:
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-roadmap-09.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-v3-05.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-09.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2510bis-06.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-pi-05.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2511bis-04.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-2797-bis-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-proxy-02.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-ipki-new-rfc2527-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-cmc-trans-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-logotypes-03.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-pkalgs-supp-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-certstore-http-02.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-dpv-dpd-req-05.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-okid-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-acrmf-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-acmc-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-rfc2560bis-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-pr-tsa-02.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-new-part1-asn1-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-warranty-extn-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-new-pkalgs-asn1-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-rfc3161bis-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-dnstrings-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-acpolicies-extn-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-wlan-extns-01.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-cvp-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-pki-schema-00.txt
  • - draft-ietf-pkix-ldap-pmi-schema-00.txt
  • Request For Comments:
    RFCStatusTitle
    RFC2459 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
    RFC2510 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols
    RFC2511 PS Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format
    RFC2527 I Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework
    RFC2528 I Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
    RFC2559 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols - LDAPv2
    RFC2585 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Operational Protocols: FTP and HTTP
    RFC2587 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure LDAPv2 Schema
    RFC2560 PS X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP
    RFC2797 PS Certificate Management Messages over CMS
    RFC2875 PS Diffie-Hellman Proof-of-Possession Algorithms
    RFC3039 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile
    RFC3029 E Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Data Validation and Certification Server Protocols
    RFC3161 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time Stamp Protocols (TSP)
    RFC3280 PS Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRL Profile
    RFC3279 PS Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and CRI Profile
    RFC3281 PS An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization

    Current Meeting Report

    PKIX WG Meeting 11/20/02
    
    Edited by Steve Kent
    
    Chairs: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>, Tim Polk 
    <tim.polk@nist.gov>
    
    The PKIX WG met once during the 55rd IETF. A total of 
    approximately 97 individuals participated in the meeting.
    
    
    Tim Polk began with a review of the agenda and document status.
         [see slides]
    
    Logotypes in X.509 Certificates - Stefan Santesson (AddTrust)
           Add specifications to require at least one logotype that fits 
    within specified size ranges, and if audio files are present at least one 
    should be within a specified time duration. Straw poll of attendees 
    supports guidelines for these features, vs. compliance requirements 
    relative to certificate contents. Will confirm this consensus via the 
    list. Another observation is that these may be guidelines for 
    certificate contents, but we ought to impose conformance 
    requirements on the clients that consume certificates, to ensure that they 
    can display logotypes (and play audio files) within some bounds. A 
    suggestion was made that clients should be required to allow users to 
    suppress playing audio files and suppress fetching the files that might be 
    referenced by URIs in this extension, and the authors agreed to 
    incorporate this requirement. [see slides]
    
    
    Discussion of competing protocols to become the standard protocol for 
    DPD/DPV.
    
    
    CVP- Tim Polk (NIST) presenting for Denis Pinkas (Bull)
                 Basically, this protocol is designed to be able to do more 
    than meet the requirements defined in 3279, but Denis (as the author of 
    that RFC) asserts that CVP is complaint with the requirements RFC. The 
    slides compare CVP features with SCVP features. [see slides]
    
    
    SCVP Protocol - Russ Housely (Vigil Security)
         Now on draft 10, which has been discussed extensively on the list. 
    Presentation addressed open issues raised in on-list discussion. [see 
    slides]
    
    
    OCSP Mike Myers (TraceRoute Security)
       No slides. Strategy here is to use extension facility to support 
    DPV/DPD requirements, building on OCSP. The document will be refreshed and 
    reposted with the description of extensions to provide this support.
    
    
    DCVS is the fourth candidate. It is RFC 3029, an experimental track RFC. It 
    is designed to provide a wide range of services, including those that we now 
    characterize as DPV/DPD.
    
    
    Proxy Certificates Von Welch (Argonne Labs)
        Document is also being worked on in Global Grid Forum. The biggest 
    residual problem is that the path validation algorithm rejects these 
    certificates since the end users are not CAs. One suggestion is to 
    validate the path up to but not including the proxy certificate, then 
    invoke path validation only for the proxy certificate, with a 
    temporary trust anchor based on the user certificate that acted as the 
    issuer of the proxy certificate. This would be consistent with the RFC 3280 
    path validation process, and might be consistent with the need for the 
    application to perform the additional checks specified for a proxy 
    certificate. A possible concern is that one needs to ensure that the trust 
    anchor inserted for this process is not retained and thus might 
    inappropriately affect later path validation invocations. Audience 
    comments support the principle of not modifying the RFC 3280 
    algorithm, though with varying rationales. The TLS WG chair suggests that 
    this really should be done in the TLS context, i.e., using the IETF 
    standard. [see slides]
    
    
    LDAP Schema - Peter Gietz (DASSI International)
          LDAP lacks matching rules support to allow selection of 
    certificates and CRLs based on specifying values for fields in these data 
    items (when multiple certificates or CRLs are stored in the same LDAP 
    entry). This approach is a metadata solution; it extracts the data from 
    certificates and CRLs and replicates the data as a set of new 
    attributes in the LDAP database, making them suitable as search 
    parameters. Clients need to be configured with the new schema, to allow 
    searching based on this approach. This is a personal draft; the 
    question is whether it belongs in PKIX? A cited concern here is that this 
    schema approach
    We will take up the question on the list. [see slides]
    
    
    Attribute Certificate Chris Francis (WebSecure Technologies)
          A new extension for attribute certificates that explicitly states the 
    policies employed on issuing the certificate, analogous to the 
    certificatePolices extension in public key certificates, and uses 
    similar syntax. Has policy qualifiers to allow an AA to specify that 
    attributes were verified at a time that might be significantly earlier than 
    the issuance date, implying that the attributes were not re-verified at the 
    time of reissuance. (WS chair note: Is this a thing we wish to 
    encourage by providing syntax for it?)
    
    Certificate Warranty Extension - Alice Sturgeon (Spyrus)
           This extension provides explicit data about warranties provided by 
    the CA, including an explicit declaration of no warranty. It's a 
    non-critical extension. This is important, because it allows one to 
    include warranty info that can be ignored, while also putting in 
    critical policy info. This combination of critical and non-critical 
    "policy" info could not otherwise be accommodated. A revised ID will be 
    posted soon. [see slides]
    
    OCSPv2 - Mike Myers (TraceRoute Security)
    Update of v1 document to add additional means of referring to a 
    certificate and offers a means by which a client can provide a pointer to a 
    CRL to check.
    
    
    Subject Identification Method - Park Jong-Wook - (Korean Information 
    Security Agency)
            Goal is to provide a way to represent a personal ID value (e.g., 
    national ID number) in a certificate in a way that does not disclose its 
    value, for privacy reasons. The proposal also includes a protocol for 
    transferring this data to the CA. The proposed virtual ID (VID), is 
    computed by double hashing the personal ID value with a 160-bit random 
    number (R), and symmetrically encrypting the result, using R as a key. 
    Looking for feedback. [see slides]
    
    
    JNSA Challenge PKI 2002 -- An Approach to a Multi-Domain PKI Test Suite"
     - Ryu Inada (Japan Network Security Association)
           This is a report on the interoperability testing activities in 
    Japan, in September. This is not a PKIX activity but the results of 
    testing are of interest, e.g., in terms of uncovering 
    interop/specification problems with PKIX standards. Test environment 
    includes CAs and VAs capable of generating data for test cases, some of 
    which intentionally do not conform to PKIX standards. We are awaiting an 
    English translation of the underlying documents. [see slides]
    

    Slides

    SCVP
    Subject Identification Method (SIM)
    Warranty Certificate Extension
    Proxy Certificate Profile
    JNSA Challenge PKI 2002