

RTCP extensions for Single Source Multicast sessions

<draft-ietf-avt-rtcpssm-01.txt>

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Overview

- Security Discussion
- Summary content
- Miscellaneous Changes and Outstanding Issues

Security Progress

- Further consideration of the security issues in new document:

http://irg.attlabs.net/rtcp_ssm/rtcp_security.{ps,pdf}

- Identifies potential solutions
- Considers potential of each case relative to security context
- Suggests a solution

Current focus is to identify a level of security that should be mandated by the draft

Security Options

- Security solution only needs to provide the same level of guarantee as current RTCP:
 - Confidentiality, **replay defense**, admission control etc. is not required (although recommended)

Fundamental Security Defense

- Authentication of Feedback address information
- Data authenticity from RTCP feedback source which controls the bandwidth calculation

In-band signalling of feedback address?

- Since some level of source authentication is required on RTCP packets, should feedback information be included in the packet?
 - Solves the problem of authenticating the feedback address
 - Also provides more flexibility with respect to changing feedback identifier during session

Out-of-band signalling of feedback address?

- Typical method
- Uses SDP + transport mechanism
 - SAP, HTTP (HTTPS), SIP....
- Each defines separate security mechanism

Draft requirements

- To what extent should this draft specify security requirements
 - Recommend suitable approaches
(SRTP/GDOI within controlled group, i.e. Using shared group key, or TESLA approach for looser control)
 - Require suitable level of security *(i.e. source data and feedback identifier MUST be authenticated)*

Miscellaneous Changes and Open Issues

- SDP Identifiers
 - Rename rtcp attribute in draft to rtcpssm to avoid conflict
 - Allow both session and media level attributes
- Revise IANA considerations
- Editorial stuff