

Mobile IP Public Key Based Authentication

<draft-jacobs-mobileip-pki-auth-00.txt>

Proposes an extension to the Mobile IP base protocol.

Allows Mobile Nodes (Hosts) and Mobility Agents (both home network and foreign network) to use

- X.509 digital certificates
- public keys
- digital signatures

as the basis of authenticating Mobile IP control messages.

Use of these mechanisms allows Mobile IP to scale to 1,000s of mobile nodes across networks owned-operated by different organizations and service providers.

Vital security requirements

Authentication

Message receiver must be able to ascertain who the actual originator of the message is.

Authorization

Network owning/operating organization must have ability to decide on attachments and what resources may be used.

Integrity

Message receiver must be able to ascertain if a message has been modified in transit.

Nonrepudiation

Message sender must not be able to falsely deny message origination.

Key Management

Only method to accurately enforce authentication, integrity and nonrepudiation is cryptography; which requires distribution/exchange of encryption key information amongst message senders and receivers.

Alternative authentication approaches

HA as a Key Distribution Center (KDC)

- Requires three separate secret keys
- 2/3 manually distributed, 1/3 generated and distributed dynamically
- An HA with 100 MNs roaming to new networks every 2 min., must generate up to 3000 secret keys/hour (1200ms/key)
- Manual distribution of 2/3 secret keys will not scale, secret keys needs $(N * N-1)/2$ keys.
- No trust relationship between MN and FA for access control and non-repudiation

Diffie-Hellman with the FA

- Requires manually distributing secret keys between MNs and HAs.
- No trust relationship between the MN and the FA for access control and non-repudiation

MN Public Key

- FA has no way of verifying if public key received from MN is valid for that MN.
- No trust relationship between MN and FA for access control and non-repudiation

FA Public Key

- Only real difference from HA as a KDC is that HA uses unauthenticated Public Key from FA for encrypting generated registration key being sent to FA rather than existing secret key SA between HA and FA.
- Inclusion of MD5 digest of FA's public key only establishes that public key supplied by FA is same as received by the MN .

Trusted Third Party Needed

- Use of public keys contained in Certificates issued by trusted third parties, i.e. Certificate Authorities (CAs), key ingredient for establishing trust Relationships between HAs, MNs and FAs.
- When FA receives message from MN digitally signed with MN's private key, FA can validate digital signature using copy of MN's public key from MN's Certificate.
- If FA shares same CA as MN, then FA can authenticate the MN's Certificate by checking CA digital signature within MN's Certificate using CA's public key from CA's Certificate
- IF FA and MN not use same CA, FA can establish a trust hierarchy path between FA's CA and MN's CA.
- Use of Certificates allows Mobile IP aware systems to establish strong trust relationships to base authentication, access control and non-repudiation decisions on.

Public Key Authenticated (PKA) Mobile IP

- Adds scaleable strong authentication to Mobile IP.
- Works exactly as base protocol for FA supplied COA mode of operation.
- Only changes generating/verifying message authenticators and the data structures supporting the proposed digital signature based authenticators.
- “Pop-Up” mode of operation, using DHCP, not deployable beyond single organization intranet.

Mobility Agent Advertisement Extension

RFC 2002 MIP

0	1	2	3
0	1	2	3
4	5	6	7
8	9	0	1
+	+	+	+
Type	Length	Sequence Number	
Registration Lifetime	R B H F M G V	reserved	
zero or more Care-of Addresses			
...			
+			

PKA MIP

0	1	2	3
0	1	2	3
4	5	6	7
8	9	0	1
+	+	+	+
Type	Length	Sequence Number	
Registration Lifetime	R B H F M G V A	Auth Type	
zero or more Care-of Addresses			
Foreign Agent Digital Signature			
+			
Type	Ext-Length	Cert-cnt	
Sender-Certificate-Length	Sender-Certificate		
Sender-Certificate, continued ...			
CA-Certificate-Length	CA-Certificate		
CA-Certificate, continued ...			
+			

Registration Request Message received by a Foreign Agent

RFC 2002 MIP

0	1	2	3				
0	1	2	3				
4	5	6	7				
8	9	0	1				
	Type	S B D M G V rsv	Lifetime				
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Home Address						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Home Agent						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Care-of Address						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
+ Identification							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
Type Length SPI							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
... SPI (cont.) Authenticator ...							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							

PKA MIP

0	1	2	3				
0	1	2	3				
1	2	3	4				
2	3	4	5				
3	4	5	6				
4	5	6	7				
5	6	7	8				
6	7	8	9				
7	8	9	0				
8	9	0	1				
Type S B r M G V A t Lifetime							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Home Address						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Home Agent						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Care-of Address						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
+ Identification							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
Type Length Auth Type reserved							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Mobile Node (MN) Digital Signature						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
Type Ext-Length Cert-cnt							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
Sender-Certificate-Length Sender-Certificate							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	Sender-Certificate, continued ...						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
CA-Certificate-Length CA-Certificate							
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							
	CA-Certificate, continued ...						
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+							

Registration Request Message Received by a Home Agent

RFC 2002 MIP


0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type S B D M G V rsv		Lifetime	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Address			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Agent			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Care-of Address			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Identification			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type Length SPI			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
... SPI (cont.) Authenticator ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type Length SPI			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
... SPI (cont.) Authenticator ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

PKA MIP


0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type S B r M G V A t		Lifetime	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Address			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Agent			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Care-of Address			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Identification			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type Length Auth Type reserved			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Mobile Node (MN) Digital Signature			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type Length Auth Type reserved			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Foreign Agent (FA) Digital Signature			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type Ext-Length Cert-cnt			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Sender-Certificate-Length Sender-Certificate			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Sender-Certificate, continued ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
CA-Certificate-Length CA-Certificate			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
CA-Certificate, continued ...			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

Registration Reply Message received by a Foreign Agent

RFC 2002 MIP



PKA MIP



Registration Reply Message received by a Mobile Node

RFC 2002 MIP

0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type	Code	Lifetime	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Address			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Home Agent			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
+ Identification			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type	Length	SPI	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
... SPI (cont.)		Authenticator ...	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
Type	Length	SPI	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			
... SPI (cont.)		Authenticator ...	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+			

PKA MIP

0	1	2	3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0	1 0 1
Type	Code	Lifetime	
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
	Home Address		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
	Home Agent		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
+ Identification			
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type	Length	Auth Type	reserved
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
	Home Agent (HA) Digital Signature		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type	Length	Auth Type	reserved
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+
	Foreign Agent (FA) Digital Signature		
+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+	+-----+-----+-----+-----+

Route Optimized and IPv6 Mobile IP

Route Optimized Mobile IP shares same authentication problems as RFC 2002 MIP

IPv6 Mobile IP plans on relying on IPsec for key distribution
IPsec currently does:

- Not address Certificate distribution
- Not address Cross-CA verification (trust hierarchy paths)
- Require a significant number of messages exchanges to negotiate Security Associations

The PHA architecture proposed here can be applied to Route Optimized and IPv6 Mobile IP