

- to be on the safe side -



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Version Number Authentication and Local Key Agreement

<draft-dvir-roll-security-extensions-00.txt>

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Contents

- DIO message (broadcast) authentication
 - prevents misbehaving (compromised) nodes to become DODAG roots by sending out a DIO message for DODAG update with an increased Version Number
- Local key exchange
 - allows each node to establish a set of pairwise keys (shared with each of its local neighbor) and a cluster key (shared with all neighbors)

Motivations for DIO message authentication

- lack of physical protection + unattended operation → nodes may be accessed physically and get compromised
- by sending a well crafted DIO message, a compromised node can easily become the root of the DODAG and divert all traffic towards itself
- as each node rebroadcasts DIO messages, a single crafted DIO message can generate a lot of traffic and increase overall energy consumption
- pairwise keys shared between neighboring nodes as envisioned in the ROLL security framework does not solve the problem

Design considerations

- requirements
 - broadcast authentication
 - only the real DODAG root should be able to generate valid DIO messages, and all nodes should be able to authenticate them
 - efficiency
 - use symmetric key cryptography as much as possible
- trade-off
 - authenticate only the Version Number
 - this ensures that (re)construction of the DODAG can only be initiated by the real DODAG root
- approach
 - use a hash chain for authenticating the Version Number, and ...
 - symmetric or asymmetric key message authentication for authenticating the root of the hash chain (and the static part of the DIO message)

Protocol overview

- the DODAG root generates a random number r , and computes a hash chain $h(r)$, $h(h(r)) = h^2(r)$, ..., $h^n(r)$
- the DODAG root distributes the root $h^n(r)$ of the hash chain to all nodes in the network by
 - including $h^n(r)$ in a DIO message
 - authenticating $h^n(r)$ and the static fields of the DIO message, such that all other nodes can be sure that $h^n(r)$ originates from the DODAG root
 - digital signature verifiable with the public key of the DODAG root
 - MAC computed with a globally shared key K that can be assumed to be non-compromised at the time of distributing and authenticating $h^n(r)$
- when the DODAG root sends out a DIO message with a new Version Number, it also releases the next hash chain value
 - note that the next hash chain value $h^{i-1}(r)$ cannot be computed from the last released value $h^i(r)$ due to the one-way property of the hash function h
- each node verifies that the new hash chain value hashes into the last received one, and stores the new value as the latest received hash chain value
- when the DODAG root runs out of hash chain values it generates a new chain and distributes its root as described before


The Broadcast Authentication option

C - Continues bit

if set then authentication data continues in the next option

H - Type of data in the Authentication Data field

- 0: not a hash value (i.e., signature or MAC)
- 1: hash chain root
- 2: current hash chain value



defines the algorithm that should be used to interpret the Auth Data field (hash fn, MAC fn, digital sig scheme)

Examples

- Broadcast Authentication options carrying a hash chain root and a digital signature on the hash chain root and the static fields of the DIO message:

```
+---+---+---+---+---+
|10| 34|0|1 |0|  0x01 |
+---+---+---+---+---+
|Hash Chain Root Value|
+-----+
+---+---+---+---+---+
|10|255|1|0 |0|  0xC0 |
+---+---+---+---+---+
|  IProt part 1      |
+-----+
+---+---+---+---+---+
|10|136|0|0 |0|  0xC0 |
+---+---+---+---+---+
|  IProt part 2      |
+-----+
```

- Broadcast Authentication option carrying the latest hash chain value:

```
+---+---+---+---+---+
|10| 34|0|2 |0|   0x01 |
+---+---+---+---+---+
|Current Hash Chain Value|
+-----+
```

Motivation for pairwise key establishment

- the RPL security framework envisions the use of cryptographic mechanisms on the links between neighboring nodes, but ...
- it does not specify a key exchange method to set up the necessary keys

The LEAP protocol

- main assumptions:
 - any node will not be compromised within time T after its deployment
 - any node can discover its neighbors and set up keys with them within time $T_{kex} < T$
 - practice T_{kex}
- protocol phases:
 - key pre-distribution phase
 - neighbor discovery phase
 - link key establishment phase
 - key erasure phase

The LEAP protocol

- key pre-distribution phase
 - before deployment, each node is loaded with a master key K
 - each node u derives a node key K_u as $K_u = f(K, u)$, where f is a one-way function
- neighbor discovery phase
 - when a node deployed, it tries to discover its neighbors by broadcasting a “HELLO” message

$u \rightarrow *: u$

- each neighbor v replies with

$v \rightarrow u: v, \text{MAC}(K_v, u|v)$


- u can compute $f(K, v) = K_v$, and verify the authenticity of the reply

The LEAP protocol

- link key establishment phase
 - u computes the link key $K_{uv} = f(K_v, u)$
 - v computes the same key
 - no messages are exchanged
 - note:
 - u does not authenticate itself to v, but ...
 - only a node that knows K can compute K_{uv}
 - a compromised node that tries to impersonate u cannot know K (see below)
- key erasure phase
 - time T after its deployment, each node deletes K and all keys it computed in the neighbor discovery phase

Integration into the RPL protocol

- LEAP protocol messages:
 - $u \rightarrow *$ (local broadcast message): u
 - $v \rightarrow u$ (response message): $v, \text{MAC}(K_v, u|v)$
- no explicit HELLO message is needed, any locally broadcasted RPL message from u can serve as the LEAP HELLO message
- LEAP response message can be piggy-backed as an option on a RPL message:



Integration options

- S1: $u \rightarrow *$ DAO Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DAO Unicast Ack
- S2: $u \rightarrow *$ DAO Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DAO Multicast Ack
- S3: $u \rightarrow *$ DAO Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DAO Multicast
- S4: $u \rightarrow *$ DIO Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DIO Unicast
- S5: $u \rightarrow *$ DIS Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DIO Unicast
- S6: $u \rightarrow *$ DIS Multicast or DIO Multicast
 $v \rightarrow u$ DIO Multicast
- S7: $u \rightarrow *$ New RPL Base Message
 $v \rightarrow u$ New RPL Base Message

Selection criteria

RPLM: The scheme should not introduce a new RPL message type.

RPLF: The scheme should not change RPL functionality.

EFFI: The scheme should be efficient (low communication and computation overhead).

STP: The local key agreement must be completed before the safe time period expires.

BN: The scheme must work when the network boots and when a new node joins the DODAG.


NEI: The scheme must find all of a node's neighbors.

MAND: The scheme should prefer mandatory RPL message types (i.e., DIO, DIS).

RELY: The scheme should not rely on DODAG or DODAGID.

Setting up a cluster key

- protocol:
 - node u generates a random key
 - for each neighbor, node u encrypts this random key with the pairwise key shared with that neighbor
 - node u sends the encrypted random key to each of its neighbors
- LEAP cluster key option:



Status of implementation

- we implemented the RPL protocol on two platforms
 - Linux 2.6.36, user space
 - TinyOS 2.x
- we implemented the security extensions on Linux using the OpenSSL library
- the TinyOS implementation will use the TinyECC library
- our implementations will be used in the demos of the WSN4CIP project
 - monitoring power grid lines and substations (Linux + WiFi)
 - monitoring a drinking water pipeline (TinyOS + TDMA based MAC)
- results of our experiments can be expected in the second half of 2011