


Trustworthy Location

draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-01


ECRIT WG

IETF 80


Tuesday, March 29, 2011



Issues Fixed and Outstanding




- Issues fixed in -01:
 - Issue #1: Threat Analysis: Missing Context
 - Issue #2: Trustworthy Location, Identity and Accountability
- Issues still outstanding
 - Issue #3: Out of date references
 - Issue #4: Untrusted location and provider intent



Issue #1


- -00 Section 4 has discussion of threats, but no discussion of previous ECRIT and GEOPRIV threat model documents.
 - Not clear how threat model in this document relates to threats explored in previous documents.
- Resolution: summarize RFC 5069 and RFC 3694, describe focus of threat model in this document.



Issue #2


- -00 text asserted that “trustworthy location may be more important than identity”, without much explanation.
- In practice, “Trustworthy Location” and accountability issues need to be analyzed together
 - Where accountability is low, prank calls (including location spoofing) can increase.
 - With the PSTN, it is not possible to contact a PSAP in another country; this may not necessarily be the case with IP-based emergency services.
 - International prank calls possible.
 - Location may be trustworthy, but emergency services call may not be.
 - Call could describe an invented situation at an actual location.
- (Partial) resolution: add text on the accountability issue.
 - Additional text (and thinking) needed.

Issue #3: Out-of-date References




- A number of the references are out of date, including references to location hiding, location conveyance, location dependability, HELD deref, etc.
- Resolution: update Section 9.1 to include latest references (see TRAC for details).

Issue #4: Untrusted Location and Provider Intent




- Not every LCP is intended for use in emergencies. For example, "location based services" can have terms of service that disclaim fitness for use in an emergency.
- Not just a legal/liability issue -- the services may not provide a level of reliability and accuracy expected of an emergency services-quality location service.

Issue #4: Potential Resolutions



- Brian Rosen:
 - "send it, but let us know what you know about it". No entity should withhold location information unless it is certain that the information it is withholding is fraudulent. While the PSAP doesn't like having to decide what to do, it's better that it has the information and knows that some of it MAY be suspect.... We want whatever location to be accurately labeled (source, method, uncertainty).

Issue #4: Potential Resolution (cont'd)



- Martin Dawson:
 - The response time attribute in the HELD location request allows the client to indicate that the intent is to use the location for emergency services (routing and/or dispatch). Depending on jurisdiction policy then the LIS may choose to provide a location or not depending on whether the operator is required to warrant such information. The client still has the opportunity to ask for location without these qualifiers if it wants to proceed on that basis; in that situation the operator does not know that the intent is to use the location for emergencies.
 - When it comes to a de-reference between the local emergency service and the network operator, there should be a clear understanding of obligations and undertakings outside the scope of the protocols anyway. I think that de-referencing is always valuable for this sort of validation and it's good policy to always provide and convey a reference for this purpose.

Feedback?

