

Draft-ietf-msec-gdoi-update-04

Sheela Rowles

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IPR Disclosure

- The authors are not aware of any IPR associated with this draft

Re-organized doc

- RFC 3547 clarifications
- Authorization: address GDOI attack via update to POP payload
- Sync to RFC5374
- New GDOI attributes

Change to Clarifications

- Deprecate KE Payload
 - Additional encryption of keying material negligible with strong ciphers and authenticated encryption of the GDOI registration.

Updates resulting from RFC5374

- Address Preservation:
 - None
 - SRC: preservation of the original source addr only
 - DST: preservation of the original dest addr only
 - Src-and-Dst: preservation of both src & dst

5374 updates (cont)

- SA Direction:
 - **Symmetric:** SA TEK policy used by multiple senders in sending and receiving direction.
 - **Receiver-only:** SA TEK policy for a single sender should be installed in receiving direction by receivers.
 - **Sender-only:** SA TEK policy for a single sender should be installed in only the sending direction by the sender.
 - **Sender-or-Receiver-only:** based on the TEK, the GM figures out which direction to install the IPsec SA

5374 updates (cont)

- Rekey Rollover:
 - ATD: time after re-key event that TEK activated
 - DTD: time after re-key event that TEK deactivated

SA GAP Payload

- **ATD:** activation time delay
- **DTD:** deactivation time delay
- **Sender ID:** no 2 senders can send a pkt with the same IV with AES counter-based modes. This attribute is used to distribute a unique SID to a GM.

Next Steps

- We would like to go last call.