Revisiting the MIP6 Security architecture

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Background

- Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] relies on IPsec for securing the signaling between the MN and HA
- RFC3776 and RFC4877 specify the details of how IPsec/IKE/IKEv2 are used with MIP6
- The choice of IPsec as the security protocol for MIP6 is historical and was based on the prevailing thinking in the IPv6 community at that time

Current View

- The choice of IPsec for securing MIP6 signaling was wrong
- This conclusion is arrived by at least those people who have implemented or attempted to implement MIP6 or DSMIP6
- The complexity of implementation and hacks needed to make MIP6 work with IPsec/IKEv2 is very high

So what do we do...

- MIP6 and consequently DSMIP6 can be significantly simplified by unplugging the MIP6 dependency on IPsec/IKEv2
 - Or at the very least have a mode for DSMIP6
 which can work without requiring IPsec/IKEv2

 An alternative* security architecture for Mobile IPv6 is proposed to be developed

^{*} Note that alternative here does not automatically suggest RFC4285

Framework of the security architecture

- An initial set of guidelines to consider for the security architecture for MIP6 are as follows:
- Dependency between MIP6 and the security module should be minimal or at least have well defined (easy) mechanisms in case of interactions
- 2. Include a mechanism for exchanging keys as part of the solution
- 3. Consider the reuse of existing security protocols
- 4. Others?

Proposal

 Work in a design team mode between IETF74 and IETF75 to develop an alternate security architecture for MIP6

 Solution to be proposed to MEXT WG at IETF75

 So if you are interested in working on this problem, contact Charlie and/or Basavaraj

