# Overview of draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-01.txt

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#### Presentation Outline

- Review of route origination security
- Review of high level ROA design
- Changes from -00
- Open Issues
  - Matching of ROAs to EE certs
  - Matching of ROAs to route advertisements
- Questions

## Route Origination Security


- ☐ One goal of this PKI is to enable ISPs to verify route origination assertions in BGP UPDATE messages
- ☐ To support this goal, each address space holder needs to digitally sign one or more objects that identify each AS authorized to advertise routes on behalf of the address space holder
- ☐ We call the object a route origination authorization (ROA)
- An address space holder issues a distinct ROA to each ISP he wants to advertise all or a portion of his address space
- ☐ Since each ISP is an address space holder, it would sign one or more ROAs (one per AS number) authorizing itself to advertise the addresses it holds

## Validity of a Route Origination

#### A route origination is valid if:

- 1. The route advertisement "matches" a ROA
  - AS number "matches"
  - IP address prefix "matches" the NLRI
- 2. The ROA "matches" an EE certificate
  - Signature is valid
  - IP addresses "match"
- 3. The EE certificate is valid as described in: draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs

## Route Origination Validation



#### ROA Design

- ☐ A ROA has four major data elements, encapsulated in a CMS signed data object
  - A version number
  - One of more address prefixes, corresponding to the NLRI that the ROA signer authorizes for origination by one or more ISPs
  - A flag indicating the semantics for matching the NLRI to the prefixes in the ROA
  - An AS number of an ISP authorized to originate routes to the above list of prefixes
- ☐ We use the CMS format to represent a signed ROA, as this format is well supported in open source software

#### Changes Since -00

- □ OID bug fix in the CMS profile
- ROAs now include only IP address prefixes and not IP address ranges (as in RFC 3779)
- Added a Boolean *ExactMatch* flag to the ROA to indicate semantics for NLRI to ROA "matching"
  - TRUE means the AS may *only* advertise the prefixes that appear in the ROA
  - FALSE means the AS may advertise the prefixes in the ROA or any more specific prefixes
- ☐ Added a section describing how a ROA is validated

#### **ROA** Format

```
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
  -- this is the ROA version #
  asID ASID,
  exactMatch BOOLEAN,
  ipAddrBlocks ROAIPAddrBlocks }
ASID ::= INTEGER
ROAIPAddrBlocks ::= SEQUENCE of ROAIPAddressFamily
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
  addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE (2..3)),
  addresses SEQUENCE OF IPAddress
-- Only two address families: IPv4 and IPv6
IPAddress ::= BIT STRING
```

#### Issue: Matching ROA to EE Cert

- ☐ EE Certificates use IP address ranges for compact representation of multiple prefixes
- ROAs include only prefixes and not ranges
- ☐ For example:

ROA includes: 11.0.0.0/8 and 12.0.0.0/8

EE Certificate: 11.0.0.0 - 12.255.255.255

☐ Proposed Solution:

Add text that clarifies this point and provides more detailed instructions for performing the comparison

## Issue: Matching ROA to NLRI (1/2)

- ☐ The -00 version of the draft specified that the NLRI in an advertisement must exactly match a prefix in the ROA
- Feedback on the list was that this is too restrictive
- The suggestion was made to introduce the following four options (taken from RPSL):
  - Exact Match
  - Any more specific prefix
  - Any more specific prefix of length exactly X
  - Any more specific prefix of length between X and Y

## Issue: Matching ROA to NLRI (2/2)

- □ Not possible to use the RPSL syntax given the current usage of RFC 3779 ASN.1
- ☐ Analysis of the RIPE IRR indicates that only two of the RPSL semantics are widely used:

Exact Match and Any More Specific Prefix

- Any Prefix of Length X was used by fewer than 5 ASes
- Prefixes between Length X and Y was used in situations where Any More Specific Prefix would also work

#### ☐ Proposed Solution:

Keep the current flag to express the Exact Match and Any More Specific Prefix semantics

