

Operational Best Practice for Peering

Joe Abley, jabley@ca.afilias.info

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I am Channelling Nistor, Marco and Tom

- What follows is an outline describing a document being written by others
 - Jon Nistor (currently at Rogers)
 - Marco Rodrigues (ex-Telus, now JNPR)
 - Tom Scholl (AT&T labs)
- None of the authors could be here this week, so you are stuck with me

“Peering BCP”

- The authors’ idea was to document the operational work carried out when the business people decide to go ahead and peer
- The title arguably needs work
 - “peering” is a loaded term

Outline

- 1.1 Definition of peers & relationship
 - 1.1.1 Transit
 - 1.1.2 Peering
- 1.2 Defining media/link types
 - 1.2.1 Point-to-Point direct
 - 1.2.1.1 Single Circuits
 - 1.2.1.2 Multiple Circuit behavior
 - 1.2.1.2.1 eBGP Multihop
 - 1.2.1.2.2 BGP Multipath
 - 1.2.2 Shared Media
- 1.3 BGP Policies
 - 1.3.1 Transmitting customer/internal networks
 - 1.3.2 Local Preference treatment of routes received
 - 1.3.3 Multi-Exit-Discriminator (MED) treatment
 - 1.3.4 BGP Community treatment
 - 1.3.5 Traffic Engineering Techniques
 - 1.3.5.1 De-Aggregates
 - 1.3.5.2 No-Export
 - 1.3.5.3 MED
 - 1.3.6 Maximum prefix limit
 - 1.3.7 AS-Path filters
 - 1.3.8 Prefix filters
- 1.4 Undesired Behavior
 - 1.4.1 Consistent Advertisements
 - 1.4.2 MED, Nearest Exit / Best Exit
 - 1.4.3 BGP Origin Codes
 - 1.4.4 Peer Tag-Team
 - 1.4.5 Tunneling via Peer
 - 1.4.6 Next-Hop-Unchanged at public exchanges
 - 1.4.7 Static-Routing
- 1.5 Peering Protection
 - 1.5.1 Packet filtering on external interfaces
 - 1.5.2 IP Options / Source Routing
 - 1.5.3 Reset Peer Next-Hop to peer address
 - 1.5.4 MAC Accounting for public exchanges
 - 1.5.5 Netflow Analysis
 - 1.5.6 Peering interfaces in IGP, iBGP
 - 1.5.7 Rejection of public exchange packets and advertisements
 - 1.5.8 Denying AS-Paths on peers
 - 1.5.9 Denying of martian/bogon prefixes received by peers
 - 1.5.10 Denying of unallocated prefixes received by peers
 - 1.5.11 MD5 Authentication
 - 1.5.12 BGP TTL Security
- 1.6 BGP Resiliency
 - 1.6.1 BGP Timers
 - 1.6.2 BFD
 - 1.6.2.1 BFD for one-hop sessions
 - 1.6.2.2 BFD for multi-hop sessions
 - 1.6.2.3 BFD Authentication
- 1.7 BGP Communities
 - 1.7.1 Purpose Communities
 - 1.7.2 Geo-Location Communities
- 1.8 Contributors
- 1.9 Acknowledgement
- 1.10 Security Considerations

Status

- Outline has been written
- Text is currently being hung from the scaffolding
- Authors expect to have a completed draft ready in the next month or so
- Authors are wondering whether GROW is a good place for this work to proceed