

DCCP Mobility and Multihoming

<draft-kohler-dccp-mobility-01.txt>

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Motivation

- Multi-homing is relevant use case for multi-access mobiles
 - Wireless Wide-Area link (e.g., GPRS) is usually available most of the time
 - Wireless LAN access can be short-lived
 - Usually mobile terminals can keep both interfaces up at the same time
- Sometimes using Mobile IP is not possible
 - Requires support in network: the home agent, sometimes a foreign agent in IPv4
- Multi-homing on transport layer has nice characteristics
 - Requires support only at the end hosts
 - Supports hand-offs between IPv4 and IPv6
 - Multiple parallel paths per connection
 - Mobility decisions can be made independently for each flow
- Often the location of server is fixed and known

Basics

- New version introduced the idea of *Generalized Connections (Gencon)*
- DCCP connections that support multi-homing are assigned Gencon ID
- *Component connections* are initialized and maintained as separate connections
 - Separate congestion control state
 - Use DCCP-Request, DCCP-Response, and DCCP-Ack as with normal DCCP connections
 - Include *Gencon option* that contains a Gencon message
 - Connections under same Gencon are owned by same socket
- Socket is closed when the last connection under Gencon is closed
- Reconfiguration of address set is protected with encrypted random nonce
 - Crypto algorithms not yet specified
- Some requirements
 - Must be safe against hijacking
 - Must be able to move between different NAT domains

Gencon Message Types (Initialization)

- (All messages contain 64-bit Gencon ID and 32-bit Component ID)
 - Client defines upper 32 bits in Gencon ID, server defines lower 32 bits
- **Initiate:** with DCCP-Request
 - Includes key type and client's public key
- **Approve:** with DCCP-Response
 - Server gives its public key

Gencon Message Types (Mobility)

- **Attach:** Assign a new address to Gencon (with DCCP-Request)
 - Includes new Component ID and an optional 64-bit random nonce to verify server
 - Component “client” can be different than the original Gencon client
- **Challenge:** To verify the identity of client (with DCCP-Response)
 - 64-bit random nonce is mandatory
 - Optional 40-byte encrypted token composed from: Message type, sequence number, acknowledgment number, Gencon ID, Component ID, and Server Nonce
- **Confirm:** To complete client identity verification (with DCCP-Ack)
 - Includes 40-byte encrypted token based on the above mentioned variables at client
- **Detach:** Removes component connection from Gencon
 - Includes 40-byte encrypted token

Comments

- Primary component ID should be defined
 - Now: last connection on which data was received
 - Could use some sort of preference scoring?
 - Or, most recent Attach indicates most preferred?
- On “Random nonce MUST NOT be reused on same Gencon ID”
 - Might lead to heavy bookkeeping on long connections
 - New text on generating apparently-random nonces coming up
- How to negotiate common key type between end hosts
 - Could client indicate the set of key types it supports?
- Allocation of component IDs
 - Receiver MUST check sender does not reuse Component ID
 - Easiest to allocate IDs incrementally

Next steps?

- To working group charter?