



btns-prob-and-applic-02

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Current Status

- 02 update 2/17/06
 - Resolve 01 issues (posted 12/05, updated 2/06)
 - Address detailed feedback from individuals
 - Public feedback addressed on mailing list 2/06
- Summary of Changes
 - Document reorganization
 - Issues addressed
 - Pending issues
- Next Steps



Revision Summary

- Sec 1 (intro)
 - Removed redundant CB, TCP spoofing
- Sec 2 (PS)
 - Added net layer motivation (IP layer, IPsec)
- Sec 3 (overview)
 - Add high-level requirements; security services provided
- Sec 4 (AS)
 - Remove modes -> move to end Sec 3
- Sec 5 (Sec. Consid.)
 - Move threat model here from PS; reorganize



Issues Done 1-6 (of 15)

NOT LISTED = clarify text as suggested

- #3 Sec 2 - explain why application credentials cannot be used in IPsec
 - different format, no API for injecting credentials
- #5 Sec 3.1.2 - explain why IPsec is needed with SSL/TLS
 - (e.g., to avoid transport level attacks)
- #6 Sec 3.1.4 - channel binding should not expose passwords
 - (see Nico's ID); clarify further.



Issues Done 7-15

- #7 Sec 3.2 - BTNS not undermine IPsec access control
 - (address earlier and in security considerations)
- #10 clarify S-CBB self-signed SSL example
 - (host in URL matches host in certificate)
- #11 clarify HTTPS and channel binding example
- #13 Sec 5.3 (now 4.2 in v01)
 - use ssh rather than SSL as leap of faith
- #15 update OE description
 - From mailing list text



Issues Not Addressed



#8 AS for SAB and CBB

- Current on/off-list feedback conflicts
- Request additional feedback based on current document structure



#9 IKE vs CBB Strength

- # vulnerabilities
- level of protection provided



#12 Sec 5 replication

- is there a better way to handle this?



#14 Leap of Faith

- discuss this on the list further (from last IETF)



Next Steps

- Seeking another round of feedback...
 - Hopefully the last before last call ;-)