Last-hop Threats to PIM

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draft-savola-pim-lasthop-threats-01.txt

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Last-hop threats to PIM (1/2)

Background

odraft-ietf-mboned-mroutesec-xx.txt (now in RFC-ed queue)

only described the multicast *routing infrastructure* threats

OThere has not been an analysis on "last-hop multicast threats"

Iast-hop meaning nodes (hosts) attacking other nodes on the same link, denying the service on the link, or bypassing the DR controls

• These issues deserved to be spelled out

□ Vulnerabilities

- Nodes may send unauthorized register messages
- ONODES may become unauthorized PIM neighbors
- Routers may accept PIM messages from non-neighbors

▷The spec should probably be tightened here..

- OAn unauthorized node may be elected as the PIM DR
- OA node may become an unauthorized asserted forwarder

Last-hop threats to PIM (2/2)

□ Threats / Attacks (exploiting the vulnerabilities)

Openial of service attack on the link

ODOS on the outside

Confidentiality, Integrity and Authorization violations

□ Mitigation methods

○PIM "passive mode"

○Using IPsec among the valid routers on a link

○IP filtering of PIM messages (all of proto=103)

• Main issues are with multiple valid PIM routers on a link

⊳you'll have to use IPsec between them to be secure.

 \triangleright with just one router, filtering PIM messages is a good method

Last-hop threats to PIM - Now what

What's the contribution of this draft?
 Explicit threat/vulnerability analysis and spelling out
 More elaborate description compared to the PIM spec section 6.1
 More extensive discussion of non-IPsec countermeasures
 and in which cases IPsec is a must

□Now what -- options:

Make this an Informational RFC of its own (WG adoption)
Add an informative reference from the PIM spec?
Merge it with the PIM-SM spec's security considerations section
Wait until the IESG evaluates the PIM spec, ask/see how they react
If necessary, then merge/refer
Make this dormant until the PIM-SM spec is revised (for DS)
Drop the project completely