Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (dccp)

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Agenda

I. Agenda Bashing	5 min
2. WG Status, Aaron Falk	5 min
3. Review of IETF Last Call/IESG review comments on DCCP spec, CCID2, CCID3, Aaron Falk	I5 min
4. Planned non-editorial changes to spec, ccid Eddie Kohler	I0 min
5. DCCP User Guide update, Tom Phelan draft-ietf-dccp-user-guide-03.txt	20 min
6. TFRC for Voice over IP, Sally Floyd draft-ietf-dccp-tfrc-voip-01.txt	30 min
7. Presentation on Rate-Adaptive Voice Codecs, Magnus Westerlund et al	30 min

Status

IETF Last Call

- Completed for spec, CCID2, CCID3
- A few comments received from IESG review
 - Summary to follow
- Comments were minor and will be fixed immediately in a cleanup revision
- Kudos to wg and authors!!! Well done.



Milestones

(not on charter page yet)

- Done Working group last call for spec and CCIDs
- Done Submit DCCP spec for IESG/IETF review to be Proposed Standard
- Done Submit DCCP CCIDs for IESG/IETF review to be Proposed Standard
- Jan 05 Revise user-guide
- Mar 05 Revise charter
- Apr 05 Working group last call on User Guide



DCCP User Guide

- Let's be honest: there's no energy in the group for this work
- We should decide if we want to plow ahead or table it until there are some implementations
- More from Tom on this



TFRC-VoIP Mode

- Simulations look promising
- Needs review from AVT-folks: will it work with known voice codecs?
- Larger issue of rate-adaptive codecs & congestion control interactions is still out there
 - Let's not pre-judge what users will accept



Last Call Comments

Section 18 says:

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- > Applications desiring hard security should use IPsec or end-to-end
- > security of some kind.

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The term "hard security" is ambiguous. This should be replaced with a list of the security services. I assume that integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and access control are the security services that are "hard."

NEW:

Applications desiring cryptographic security services (integrity, authentication, confidentiality, access control, anti-replay protection) should use IPsec or end-to-end security of some kind (SRTP is another candidate protocol).



This is a very well-written and comprehensive specification. There seems to be one thing missing that I think would improve the specification of DCCP over IPv6 -- an indication of when DCCP should send reachability confirmations as described in RFC 246I (and, perhaps more importantly, when it should not).

Appendix E.I of draft-ietf-ipv6-246Ibis-02.txt describes how TCP would know when to send (and not to send) this type of confirmation, and could be used as a guide. However, I think that this determination might be a bit more complicated in DCCP, due to its more complex set of acknowledgement (and acknowledgement or acknowledgement) options.



response

(paraphrasing Eddie)

- Could say that DCCP sends a reachability confirmation to IP layer when DCCP receives a packet with a higher Acknowledgement Number than previously seen
- But seems wrong to put this in spec when it is a transport-wide issue
- Suggest that transport-wide recommendations be developed



The CCID documents should include the text about the motivation for their IANA codespaces that appears in the protocol spec, section 10.3. That said, no ccid-specific options, reset codes or feature codes are registered, so please say that. Because a standards track congestion control protocol must have assured behavior, its extensions must be tightly reviewed, so the extensions for these CCIDs have to be standards track. Replace IETF Consensus with Standards Action when a CCID is standards track.



On the IANA Considerations - read the comment on the ccid specs first. Although it would/will be nice to have DCCP extensions contended by multiple parties, the RSVP, SIP and other cases argue that the protocol loses if it is not reviewed centrally. 2434's IETF Consensus policy term is not even clear enough to ensure IETF review, so this Discuss is a request to change some language:

19.2, 19.3, 19.4

OLD

IETF Consensus policy, which requires RFC publication (not necessarily standards-track).

NEW:

IETF Consensus policy, requiring an IETF RFC publication with IESG review, though it need not be standards track.

