

# Functional decomposition

multi6 wg meeting - IETF 61

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# Goal of the document

- Walkthrough the possible messages of a multi6 protocol for preserving established communications through locator changes
- Agnostic to the security mechanism used in protecting the control messages

# Outline

- Initial contact
- Capabilities detection
- M6 host-pair context establishment
- Locator set management
- Re-homing procedure
- Removal of M6 session state

# Initial contact

- Required information
  - ULID
  - reachable locator
- If  $ULID == \text{reachable locator}$ , then no special M6 capabilities required
- If  $ULID \neq \text{reachable locator}$ , then move to capabilities detection

# Failure during start-up

- If the locator for initial contact unreachable the options are:
  - (App) retries using different address (locator & ULID).
  - Keep the ULID and change the locator. Needs M6 support, so cap. detection.
    - Transparent to apps

# M6 Capabilities detection

- Node Configuration
- DNS Configuration
- Host-Based Dynamic Discovery
  - Independent
  - Integrated (preferred)

# M6 host-pair context establishment


- ULIDs
- at least one locator per host
- additional locators?
- context tag? -> demux
- Security information
  - cookie/key/hash chain anchor to require on path presence to the peer
    - can be used for following messages
  - additional security info to prevent future (time-shifted) attacks

# M6 host-pair context establishment


- DoS protection
  - Memory exhaustion (state)
  - CPU exhaustion (?)
  - the receiver should not create state before the initiator
  - => 4 way handshake




# M6 host-pair context establishment exchange




# M6 host-pair context establishment exchange



# M6 host-pair context establishment exchange



# M6 host-pair context establishment exchange



# Locator set management

- adding new locators
- removing existing locators
  - local reasons such as deprecated address (RADV)
- Possible approaches
  - incremental - add/rm/ack
  - atomic - loc set/ack

# Locator set management security

- Adding locators
  - time-shifted attack protection
  - Not enough with cookie/key exchanged in context establishment
- Removing locators
  - May be enough with cookie/key exchanged in context establishment

# Rehoming

- new locator pair used for the communication
- rehoming steps
  - detecting failure
  - exploring alternative locator pairs
  - re-homing to reachable locator pair
- Verification of reachability  
(current and prospective pairs)
  - Reachability test exchange
  - Not trivial when unidirectional paths (see Jari's presentation for the complex stuff)

# Removal of M6 session state

- Unilateral
  - no packet exchange required
  - non-existent context error msg may be needed
  - Potential security issues?
- Coordinated
  - Close/Close\_Ack for each (NOID)
- Security
  - Initial cookie/key/hca
  - error msg?