

Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) Spec Walkthrough




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Outline

- Problem & alternatives
- Design choices & philosophy
- Connection overview
- Generic header & sequence numbers
- Packet types
- Reliable feature negotiation
- Acknowledgement options
- CCIDs

**Much
will
be
skipped
...**

Problem

- 
- Increasing use of UDP for long-lived flows
 - Streaming media, telephony, on-line games
 - Prefer timeliness over reliability
 - TCP can introduce arbitrary retransmission delay
 - Growth of long-lived, non-congestion-controlled traffic poses a threat to the health of the Internet

Application requirements & preferences

- Different congestion control mechanisms
 - TCP-like: higher throughput, abrupt rate changes (games)
 - TFRC: steadier rate, lower throughput in changing env (telephony)
- Middlebox traversal
- Low per-packet byte overhead
- Buffering control: don't deliver old data
- Access to ECN
- DoS avoidance

Alternatives

- Congestion control above UDP?
 - Burdensome to app designer
 - Access to ECN problematic
- Congestion control below UDP? (CM)
 - Application feedback for acknowledgements burdensome
 - Multiple CC mechanisms?
- Unreliable SCTP?
 - Verbose header (multiple stream support)
 - Single CC mechanism
- A new transport protocol?
 - Best option

Fundamental design choices

- In-band signalling

Alternative: assume a separate signalling channel

- Bidirectional communication

Alternative: one-way data flow

- Per-packet sequence numbers

Even pure acknowledgements occupy sequence number space

Alternatives: per-byte or per-data-packet

Design philosophy


- Focus: modern congestion control
 - Provide access to all features required or helpful
 - Multiple CC mechanisms, ECN, ECN Nonce, partial checksums, ...
- Ancillary features: consider inclusion if they cannot be layered on top
 - No support for multiple streams, partial reliability, FEC, ...
 - Mobility cannot be layered on top
- “General principle of robustness”
 - Be conservative in what you do, liberal in what you accept from others (modulo security)
 - Reserve **MUST** for absolute interoperability requirements
 - Example: Reserved fields **MUST** be ignored, **SHOULD** be set to zero

Note



- This spec walkthrough refers to DCCP as it currently is defined, with changes suggested by reviewers. Most, but not all, of those changes are in the most recently available drafts.


Packet types



DCCP-Request	client → server: open connection
DCCP-Response	server → client: response
DCCP-Data	transmit data (no ack info)
DCCP-Ack	transmit ack info (no data)
DCCP-DataAck	DCCP-Data + DCCP-DataAck
DCCP-CloseReq	server → client: close connection
DCCP-Close	close connection
DCCP-Reset	destroy connection
DCCP-Move	move IP address/port

- No simultaneous open

States



CLOSED	nonexistent connection
LISTEN	server in passive listening state
REQUEST	client beginning handshake
RESPOND	server responding to request
OPEN	data transfer (TCP's ESTABLISHED)
CLOSEREQ	server asking client to close
CLOSING	waiting for final Reset
TIME-WAIT	2MSL wait (at receiver of Reset)

- No half-closed states

Two half-connections

- A **half-connection** is data flowing in one direction, plus the corresponding acknowledgements
- A DCCP connection contains two half-connections
 - A \longrightarrow B data plus B \longrightarrow A acks
 - B \longrightarrow A data plus A \longrightarrow B acks
 - Can piggyback acks on data (DCCP-DataAck)
- Conceptually separate
 - May use different congestion control mechanisms
- Terminology
 - Given a half-connection, the **HC-Sender** is the endpoint sending data, the **HC-Receiver** the endpoint sending acks

CCIDs & feature negotiation

- Congestion control mechanism represented by a CC Identifier (**CCID**)

CCID 2 = TCP-like, CCID 3 = TFRC

Defines how the HC-Sender limits data rates and how the HC-Receiver sends congestion feedback

- Feature negotiation

A generic mechanism to reliably negotiate the values of shared parameters


Example feature type: CCID

Each feature type corresponds to two independent features, one per half-connection


Choosing a CCID

- CCID 2 (TCP-like): quickly get available B/W
 - Cost: sawtooth rate—halve rate on single congestion event
 - May be more appropriate for on-line games
 - More bandwidth means more precise location information; UI cost of whipsawing rates not so bad
- CCID 3 (TFRC [RFC 3448]): respond gradually to congestion
 - Single congestion event does not halve rate
 - Cost: respond gradually to available B/W as well
 - May be more appropriate for telephony, streaming media
 - UI cost of whipsawing rates catastrophic
- Neither appropriate for apps that vary packet size in response to congestion
 - Wait for standardization (TFRC-PS, ...)


Sample connection: client close



Sample connection: server close



Packet header




- Different packets have different headers

In all cases, header followed by options


Sometimes, options followed by payload

Ports, type, data offset



- **Source Port** and **Dest Port** as in TCP, UDP
- **Type** identifies packet type
Not flags word; 7 types left for expansion
- **Data Offset**: header length, including options, in 32-bit words
Up to 1008 bytes of options

CCval




- 4-bit space reserved for use by HC-Sender CCID

Can remove the need for options, reducing byte overhead

Example: TFRC's Window Counter option

Checksum and Cslen



- **Checksum:** Internet checksum of the DCCP header, options, a pseudoheader, plus some amount of the payload
- **Cslen** determines how much payload is covered by Checksum
 - 0: no payload covered
 - 15: all payload covered
 - 1–14: that many initial 32-bit words of payload covered

Partial checksums

- Inspired by UDP-Lite
- Motivation: Some links frequently deliver corrupt data
 - Link-layer retransmissions can greatly delay delivery
 - Our target applications can deal with loss, many can also deal with corruption
 - Delivering corrupt data may improve user's perception of service quality
- Corruption is not always an indication of congestion
 - Congestion response to corruption too harsh on links with constant nonminimal corruption rate
 - Want to differentiate corruption loss and congestion loss, whether or not app can handle corrupt data
- Partial checksums not useful with IPsec AH

Payload Checksum option

- Useful particularly with partial checksums

Partial header checksum cannot detect corruption in payload

Payload checksum option detects payload corruption only


```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00101101|00000100|  Checksum  |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=45  Length=4
```

- **Checksum** is Internet checksum of payload

If checksum broken, discard payload (or give to application with explicit corruption notification)

Packet still “received”! (Data Dropped, later)

NDP




- Number of non-data packets sent on the connection mod 16
- Intended mostly for HC-Receiver's application

Was any of my payload lost?

Derive application sequence number from DCCP Sequence Number and # NDP

- Ambiguous after ≥ 16 consecutive lost packets

Sequence numbers



- Sequence Number

Increases by one on every packet sent, including pure acks

Wrapping an issue

- Acknowledgement Number

Acknowledges GSR, greatest (mod 2^{24}) valid seqno received

Not present on DCCP-Request and DCCP-Data packets

Not a cumulative ack, not a promise of data delivery

Sequence number validity

- DCCP checks packet's Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers for validity
 - Defense against delivery of old segments
 - Defense against half-open connections
 - Defense against attack
- General approach: Loss Window
 - Sequence numbers within Loss Window are valid
- Compare TCP's receive window
 - No cumulative ack, so packets older than GSR may be OK (reordering)
 - Not a flow control mechanism

Staying in sync



- Problem: sequence numbers advance on every packet
- A long enough burst of loss could cause the endpoints' sequence numbers to get out of sync relative to any window

Even if only acks are sent

- Need a mechanism to get back into sync

Identification option

Hold on to your hats

Loss window width



- HC-Sender decides on a loss window width W_S for sequence numbers
 - Should reflect how many packets the sender expects to be in flight
 - Suggestion: 3–4x the maximum number of packets sent per RTT
 - HC-Sender informs HC-Receiver of W_S through feature negotiation
 - Too small \longrightarrow often out of sync; too large \longrightarrow attackable
 - Defaults to 1000
- HC-Receiver decides on a loss window width W_A for ack numbers
 - Equals the loss window width it chose in its role as HC-Sender on the other half-connection

Loss window definitions


- CLOSED and LISTEN states

All packets are sequence-valid

- Other states

Sequence number must lie in $[GSR - \lfloor W_S/3 + 1 \rfloor, GSR + \lceil 2W_S/3 \rceil]$

Acknowledgement number must lie in $[GSS - W_A + 1, GSS]$



Requirements for sequence validity

- (1) The Acknowledgement Number is in the relevant window, AND EITHER:
 - (2a) The Sequence Number is in the relevant window, OR
 - (2b) The packet has a correct Identification or Challenge option, OR
 - (2c) The packet is a DCCP-Reset and its Sequence Number is zero.
- Explanation
 - (1) prevents replay attacks
 - (2b) is necessary for getting back in sync
 - (2c) is necessary for cleaning up half-open connections

If a packet is sequence-invalid

- Send a DCCP-Ack

Acknowledge the packet's Sequence Number (not GSR!)

Include a Challenge option

Exception: send nothing if the packet was a Reset

- DoS protection

SHOULD ignore packets with bad Sequence Numbers if connection active (valid packet received within ~ 1 s or 1 RTT)

MAY ignore packets with bad Sequence Numbers for some time after receiving an incorrect Identification option (checking Identification may be CPU intensive)

MAY rate limit DCCP-Ack generation

Identification and Challenge

- Endpoints exchange random Connection Nonces at startup

Or exchange them over a secure channel

- Identification option:

```
+-----+-----+-----+-- ... --+-----+
|00101010|00010010|  Identification Data  |
+-----+-----+-----+-- ... --+-----+
Type=42   Len=18 \_____16 bytes_____/
```


MD5 sum of packet's Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers,
this endpoint's Nonce, and the other endpoint's Nonce

Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers prevent replay


Nonces prevent spoofing

- Challenge option is like Identification, but receiver should respond with Identification


Resync after burst of loss



Half-open connection cleanup



State diagram



In a table

- Respond to sequence-valid packets and timeouts as follows:


State	Request	Resp.	Data/Ack/ Move	C-Req	Close	Reset	[Timeout]
CLOSED	Rst	Rst	Rst	Rst	Rst	-	
LISTEN	RESP.	Rst	Rst(1)	Rst	Rst	-	
REQUEST	Rst	OPEN	Rst	Rst	Rst	TW	REQ
RESPOND	-/RESP.	Rst	Rst/OPEN	Rst	C-ED	TW	C-ED
Server OPEN	-/Rst	Rst	OPEN	Rst	C-ED	TW	
Client OPEN	Rst	-/Rst	OPEN	C-ING	C-ED	TW	
CLOSEREQ	-/Rst	Rst	C-REQ	Rst	C-ED	TW	C-REQ
CLOSING	Rst	-/Rst	C-ING	C-ING	C-ED	TW	C-ING
TIME-WAIT	Rst	Rst	Rst	Rst	Rst	-	C-ED

- Packets sent on state transitions:
- App events:

REQUEST Request
 RESPOND Response
 OPEN Ack/DataAck
 CLOSEREQ CloseReq
 CLOSING Close
 CLOSED Reset
 TIME-WAIT -


Passive open LISTEN
 Active open REQUEST
 Close C-REQ/CLOSING

DCCP-Request




- Service Name
 - Specifies an app-level service ('HTTP' = 1213486160)
 - Ports also come with Service Names; mismatch causes Reset
 - IANA registry: first-come, first-serve
- Contains data
 - Server may ignore

DCCP-Response



- Send in response to Requests
 - Including retransmitted Requests
 - Ignore data on retransmitted Requests
- For DoS protection, use Init Cookie

DCCP-[Data][Ack]



- DCCP-Data = black + green
- DCCP-Ack = black + blue
- DCCP-DataAck = black + green + blue

DCCP-Data: minimal overhead in common (unidirectional) case

DCCP-Ack: separate type enables 0-length datagrams





- Example Reasons: Closed (normal close), Aborted, Fruitless Negotiation (a feature negotiation took too long), etc.

Mobility

- Cannot be layered on top

Part of our charter

- Basic mechanism: endpoint moves, sends DCCP-Move from new address

DCCP-Move contains old address so flow can be identified

Also security mechanisms (Identification)

Stationary endpoint acknowledges with DCCP-[Data]Ack

- Authors vote “+0.1” on mobility

But cleanly separable from rest of protocol

Doesn't add complexity outside of Move itself



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DCCP-Move security

- Mandatory **Identification** prevents hijacking
Unless attacker snooped on Nonce exchange
- Ignore invalid Moves
Invalid sequence numbers, Identification, or connection not mobility capable
Do not send Reset or Ack—would leak information!
- DoS resistance
MAY ignore all Moves for some time after receiving an invalid Move

Options

- One-byte options: Type = 0 ... 31

```
+-----+  
|Opt Type|  
+-----+
```

- Multibyte options: Type = 32 ... 255

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----  
|Opt Type| Length | Data ...  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----
```

Length ≥ 2

Ignored option



```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00100000| Length |Opt Type|  Opt Data ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
```

Type=32

- Informs receiver that one of its options was not understood

CCID-specific options

- CCIDs will need to allocate options

New acknowledgement formats, ...

A shame to deal with IANA for this

- Options 128 ... 255 are CCID-specific

128 ... 191: option sender is HC-Sender

192 ... 255: option sender is HC-Receiver

Feature negotiation

- The endpoints must agree on several of the connection's parameters

The CCIDs, CCID-specific settings, Loss Window, Connection Nonces, ...

- This agreement must be reliable

A shame to reinvent reliability for each feature

- Invent a general framework for **features**

= Things that will be reliably negotiated

Identified by one-byte **feature numbers**

Use three options to negotiate feature values

Change, Prefer, Confirm

- Change: “Please use this value for a feature”

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00100001| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=33
```

- Prefer: “I would rather use one of these values”

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00100010| Length |Feature#| Value or Values ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=34
```

- Confirm: “OK, I am using this value”

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00100011| Length |Feature#| Value ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=35
```

Reliability through retransmission

- Retransmit Change until you get a response
Response = Prefer, Confirm, or Ignored
- Retransmit Prefer until you get a response
Response = Change, or Ignored
- Piggyback feature negotiation on existing traffic, or use additional Acks as allowed by CCID
- State diagrams in draft
Need more specification of retransmission algorithm
Only for non-reordered packets

Feature negotiation examples

DCCP A & Assumed Value

KNOWN	4		(Initial State)	
CHANGING	4	→	Change(CC, 2)	→
KNOWN	2	←	Confirm(CC, 2)	←
CHANGING	4	→	Change(CC, 2)	→
CHANGING	4	←	Prefer(CC, 1, 3)	←
CHANGING	4	→	Change(CC, 3)	→
KNOWN	3	←	Confirm(CC, 3)	←
CHANGING	4	→	Change(CC, 2)	→
		XXX	Confirm(CC, 2)	←
CHANGING	4	→	Change(CC, 2)	→
KNOWN	2	←	Confirm(CC, 2)	←

DCCP B & Actual Value

KNOWN	4
KNOWN	2
KNOWN	2
CONFIRMING	4
CONFIRMING	4
KNOWN	3
KNOWN	3
KNOWN	2
KNOWN	2
KNOWN	2
KNOWN	2

CCID-specific features

- Features 128 ... 255 are reserved for CCIDs

128 ... 191: feature located at HC-Sender

192 ... 255: feature located at HC-Receiver

- Examples

Say A \longrightarrow B using CCID 2, B \longrightarrow A using CCID 3

A \longrightarrow Change(128, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 3's feature 128 @ B

A \longrightarrow Change(192, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 2's feature 192 @ B

A \longrightarrow Prefer(128, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 2's feature 128 @ A

A \longrightarrow Prefer(192, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 3's feature 192 @ A

A \longrightarrow Confirm(128, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 2's feature 128 @ A

A \longrightarrow Confirm(192, Foo) \longrightarrow B refers to CCID 3's feature 192 @ A

Other options

- Init Cookie

Like a large SYN Cookie: DoS protection

Server sends on Response

Packages up connection state

Client must echo on its Ack


Server can forget connection until the Ack arrives

```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|00100100| Length |           Init Cookie Value           ...
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=36
```

- Timestamp, Elapsed Time, Timestamp Echo

See draft

CCIDs

- 
- Each congestion control mechanism corresponds to a CCID
 - Each half-connection has a CC feature: that half-connection's CCID

Feature number 1

- Assigned CCIDs:
 - 0** Reserved
 - 1** Unspecified Sender-Based Congestion Control
 - 2** TCP-like Congestion Control
 - 3** TFRC Congestion Control

CCID negotiation

- Negotiated at connection startup
 - Renegotiation may not work
- Change(CC), Prefer(CC) options take a prioritized list
 - “Change(CC 2, 3)”: I would rather you use CCID 2, but CCID 3 is also acceptable.
- 2 is default
 - If not appropriate, don't send data, negotiate first thing
- 1, 2 suggested for interoperability

Data congestion control

- CCID says when its HC-Sender can send data
Like a function `ccid-allows-data: Packet → bool`
- CCIDs will refer to IETF-approved congestion control mechanisms
Currently all TCP-friendly

CCID 1

- Forward compatibility for sender-based mechanisms
 - Server can implement new CC mechanism without waiting for ubiquitous deployment
 - Not intended for production deployment of proprietary or experimental protocols; production uses **MUST** have been approved by the IETF
 - Proposing CCID 1 only (with no backup) is outlawed
- Depends on receiver being able to provide the relevant feedback
 - Probably Ack Vector

Acknowledgements

- Acknowledgement Number is GSR
 - Cumulative ack meaningless in an unreliable protocol
 - Additional ack information required to detect losses
- Different CCIDs require different acknowledgement formats
- Generic ack option: Ack Vector
 - Run-length-encoded vector: exactly which packets have been received
- TFRC ack options: Receive Rate, Loss Event Rate, Loss Intervals
- Acknowledgements must be reliable
 - Retransmit until received

Acks of acks

- Acknowledgement information represents state

Consider Ack Vector

- Must occasionally free the state
... once the sender has received the information
- Thus, sender must ack the receiver's acks

Data flowing on both HCs: no problem

Data flowing on only one HC: ... ?

Unidirectional connections and quiescence

- Must free ack information even if data flowing on only one HC
 - Complex ack data, such as Ack Vector, probably not required
 - Just send an Acknowledgement Number every now and then
- Must detect **quiescence**
 - When an HC falls silent
 - CCID-specific, but usually no data sent within $\max(0.2s, 2 \text{ RTT})$
- When one CCID is quiescent, the other CCID says how to handle acks-of-acks
 - CCID 2: send at least one Acknowledgement Number per cwnd
 - CCID 3: if Ack Vector, same as CCID 2; if not, do nothing

Acknowledgement congestion control

- Acks take up sequence number space
 - So we can detect their loss
 - And perform congestion control
- CCID says when its HC-Receiver can send acks
 - Another function `ccid-allows-ack: Packet → bool`
- TCP-friendliness not necessary
 - Intended to be “better than TCP’s acks”
- Ack Ratio feature
 - Send one ack per R data packets
 - R defaults to 2
 - Delayed Acks OK
 - Some CCIDs may do ack CC in another way

Ack Vector option

- Run-length encoded history of data packets received

Steroidal SACK

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----	Codes (SS)
001001?? Length SSLLLLLL SSLLLLLL SSLLLLLL ...	0 received non-marked
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----	1 received ECN marked
Type=37/38 _____ Vector _____...	3 not yet received

Start at Acknowledgement Number, move backwards

Up to 16192 data packets acknowledged per option

- Includes ECN Nonce Echo (Type 37 = Nonce 0, 38 = Nonce 1)
Nonce Echo = XOR of all Nonces on Code 0 packets in Vector
Probabilistic verification that receiver is reporting ECN CE correctly
- Want API to provide Ack Vector information to app

Ack Vector code meaning

- Codes 0 and 1
 - MUST have been processed by the receiving DCCP
 - MUST have been header-checksum-valid and sequence-valid
 - MUST have had their options processed
 - Data might not have been processed; it may even have been dropped
- Code 3
 - MUST NOT have been processed by the receiving DCCP
 - MUST NOT have had their options processed
 - Acknowledgement Number MUST NOT correspond to a Code 3 packet
- Summary: “Acknowledgement means **header** acknowledgement”

Ack Vector consistency

- Two Ack Vectors might acknowledge a packet differently

Packet arrives between Acks, Acks reordered, only one copy of a duplicated segment gets ECN marked, ...

- Combine codes according to these tables:

HC-Receiver (Ack generation)

		Received Pkt		
		0	1	3
Old	0	0	0/1	0
Ack	1	0/1	1	1
Code	3	0	1	3

HC-Sender (Ack processing)

		Received Code		
		0	1	3
Old	0	0	0/1	0
Ack	1	1	1	1
Code	3	0	1	3

Flow control

- What if the receiver is slower than the available bandwidth?

Explicit receive window, like TCP's flow control, inappropriate for unreliable traffic

Besides, the “correct” application response to CPU overload might be to send more traffic! (Less compression = less CPU)

- DCCP has three flow control mechanisms

Slow Receiver: Don't increase your rate

Receive buffer drops with Data Dropped: Reduce your rate

False drop/ECN mark reports: Reduce your rate a lot

Slow Receiver option

- The HC-Receiver is having trouble keeping up

HC-Sender CC semantics: Do not increase your rate (cwnd, whatever) for about 1 RTT after seeing Slow Receiver

```
+-----+  
|00000010|  
+-----+  
Type=2
```

Data Dropped option

- Ack Vector says whether packets' *headers* were processed
- Data Dropped option does the equivalent for *payloads*
 - Precise feedback on which packets were dropped *and why*
 - Useful for application
- Report receive buffer drops with Data Dropped
- Use the same mechanism to report other payload drops
 - Protocol constraints (for instance, no payloads accepted on Requests)
 - Application no longer listening (half-closed socket)
 - Corruption drop (Payload Checksum failed)
- Enables richer responses to non-congestion losses

Data Dropped format

~~~~~  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
|00100111| Length | Block | Block | Block | ...  
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+  
Type=39 \\_\_\_\_\_ Vector \_\_\_\_\_ ...

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+  
|0| Run Length |  
+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+  
Normal Block

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+  
|1|Dr St|Run Len|  
+-+-+--+--+--+--+--+  
Drop Block

## Drop Codes

- 0 dropped, protocol constraints
- 1 dropped, app not listening
- 2 dropped, receive buffer
- 3 dropped, corrupt
- 7 delivered, corrupt

# Data Dropped semantics

- CC mechanisms may respond Data Dropped
  - Each Data Dropped packet **SHOULD** be treated as ECN marked unless otherwise specified
- Particular codes
  - 0 (protocol constraints): Don't send data until protocol constraint lifted
  - 1 (app not listening): Send no more data ever
  - 2 (receive buffer drop): Reduce cwnd by 1 (TFRC TBD)

# ECN

- Protocol ECN capable

All acknowledgement formats support ECN Nonce Echo

Requirement for verifiable Nonce Echo changed several option designs (for instance, Data Dropped)

- ECN capability not required

Negotiate ECN Capable feature to 0

For instance, HC-Sender doesn't want to verify Nonce Echo →  
turn off ECN

- Responding to nonce errors

One kind of aggression: misbehaving receiver wants more than it deserves

Consistent nonce errors can lead to connection reset (Aggression Penalty)

# MTU

- Protocol supports PMTU discovery

Need to track PMTUD

- CCID may also set its own MTU
- Connection MTU =  $\min(\text{PMTU}, \text{CCID MTU})$
- User allowed to turn off PMTU discovery (leave DF off)

User cannot avoid CCID MTU

# Middlebox considerations

- Service Name particularly useful
- Modifying Sequence and Acknowledgement Numbers painful
  - Must modify Ack Vector—can't just bump a cumulative ack
  - CCID-specific options like TFRC's Loss Intervals
  - Identification includes sequence numbers in cryptographic hash
  - Must respond to congestion on introduced packets or risk Aggression Penalty
  - But it's a datagram protocol, so many data manipulations easier than in TCP

# End DCCP Spec

## CCID 2

- TCP-like Congestion Control
  - Good TCP-friendly available B/W utilization
  - Abrupt AIMD rate changes
- Congestion control algorithms based on SACK TCP
  - cwnd, ssthresh, pipe
  - Round-trip time estimation
  - Acknowledgements use Ack Vector
- Ack congestion control
  - Very roughly TCP-friendly manipulations of Ack Ratio

# CCID 2 congestion control overview: Variables

- cwnd = congestion window

Maximum number of data packets allowed in the network

- ssthresh = slow-start threshold

Controls adjustments to cwnd

- pipe

Sender's estimate of number of outstanding data packets

MAY send data packets iff  $\text{pipe} < \text{cwnd}$

Increase pipe by 1 on every newly sent data packet

# pipe reduction

- HC-Sender reduces pipe as it infers data packets have left the network
- Reduce pipe by 1 for each data packet newly acked as A-V Code 0 or 1
- Reduce pipe by 1 for each data packet inferred as lost due to “dupacks”

$P$  inferred lost when at least NUMDUPACK packets after  $P$  have been acked as A-V Code 0 or 1

The NUMDUPACK packets need not be data packets specifically

- “Retransmit” timeouts, in case a whole window lost

Estimate RTT à la TCP

Set RTO à la TCP (but minimum RTO not necessary)

When RTO occurs, set pipe to 0

# cwnd manipulation

- Congestion events halve cwnd, set ssthresh = new cwnd  
One or more packets lost or marked from a window of data  
Marked = A-V Code 1; lost = inferred through NUMDUPACK
- RTOs set ssthresh = cwnd/2, then set cwnd = 1
- Congestion window increases  
When  $cwnd < ssthresh$ , increase cwnd by 1 for every newly acknowledged data packet, up to some max)  
Otherwise, increase by 1 for every window of data acknowledged without lost or marked packets

# Sending acknowledgements

- Send about one ack per  $R$  data packets received

$R$  is the Ack Ratio

- Reasons to send more acks

Delayed ack timer à la TCP

Ack piggybacking doesn't count towards  $R$

- Acks can be sent with ECN Capable Transport since they are congestion controlled

# Congestion control on acknowledgements

- Rough guidelines

Just try to be somewhat better than TCP

- For each cwnd of data with at least one lost or marked ack, double  $R$  (Ack Ratio)
- For each  $\text{cwnd} / (R^2 - R)$  cwnds of data with no lost or marked acks, decrease  $R$  by one

Derivation in draft

## Quiescence and acks of acks



- HC-Receiver detects that HC-Sender is quiescent when  $\max(0.2 \text{ sec}, 2 \text{ RTT})$  have passed without receiving data
- When other CCID is quiescent, HC-Sender sends about one ack per cwnd

# Differences from TCP

- Congestion control in terms of packets, not bytes

No consideration of different packet lengths

CCID 2 will specify an MTU of 1500

- Congestion window increases in slow start

In line with ABC

- Ack Ratio

End  
CCID 2

## CCID 3

- TFRC Congestion Control

TCP-friendly, but avoids abrupt rate changes

Problems utilizing available bandwidth in rapidly changing environments

- TFRC congestion control algorithms

Equation-based congestion control

Receiver calculates loss event rate, sender adjusts accordingly

Acknowledgements need not use Ack Vector

## CCID 3 congestion control overview

- HC-Sender sends data packets at most at the rate specified by the TCP throughput equation [PFTK98]

Rate-based congestion control

Data packets include Window Counter (helps receiver distinguish packets sent in different RTTs); sent in CCval

- HC-Sender updates rate based on the loss event rate specified on acknowledgement packets

Or it can calculate that rate itself from Ack Vector or Loss Intervals

- Draft refers to TFRC

Perhaps too much

## Loss events



- A Loss Interval:
  - Begins with a lost or marked packet
  - Continues for one round-trip time's worth of packets (lost, marked, or not)
  - Concludes with an arbitrary-length tail of non-lost, non-marked packets
- The Loss Event Rate:
  - The inverse of a weighted average of the last 8 Loss Interval lengths

# Acknowledgements

- Elapsed Time and/or Timestamp Echo options

Aid RTT estimation

Particularly important since feedback packets sent once per RTT,  
so Elapsed Time may be large

- Receive Rate option

How fast has the receiver been receiving data?

- One or more options describing the loss event rate

Loss Event Rate: lists rate explicitly

Loss Intervals: the beginning and end of each loss interval


Ack Vector: sender can calculate loss intervals

# Loss Event Rate option



```
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 11000000|00000110|          Loss Event Rate          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
Type=192   Len=6
```

- Receiver's calculation of loss event rate
- But not verifiable



- 86

End  
CCID 3