
Architectural Considerations for Providing Carrier Class Telephony Services Utilizing SIP...

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**AT&T, CableLabs, 3Com, Cisco, Com21, General Instrument,
Lucent Cable, NetSpeak, Telcordia**


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IETF Presentation

Requirements from a Service Provider's Perspective

- ◆ Need for differentiated quality-of-service is fundamental
 - must support resource reservation and admission control, where needed
 - hope SIP enables lots of new services; also desire to meet needs of current users
- ◆ Allow for authentication and authorization on a call-by-call basis
- ◆ **Can't trust** CPE to transmit accurate information or keep it private
- ◆ Need to guarantee privacy and accuracy of feature information
 - e.g., Caller ID, Caller ID-block, Calling Name, Called Party
 - » privacy may also imply keeping IP addresses private
- ◆ Protect the network from fraud and theft of service
 - critical, given the incentive to bypass network controls
- ◆ We must be able to operate in large scale, cost-effectively
 - don't keep state for stable calls in proxies; end-points can keep state associated with their own calls

Distributed Call Signaling Framework



- ◆ Designed as a complete end-to-end signaling architecture for PacketCable
 - Philosophy: encourage features and services in intelligent end-points, wherever technically and economically feasible
 - “DCS-Proxy” designed to be scalable transaction server
 - Resource management protocol provides necessary semantics for telephony
 - “Gates” (packet classifiers) at network edge allow us to avoid theft of service


DCS Architecture

- ◆ Enhances SIP With Carrier Class Features
 - Resource Management
 - Privacy
 - Authorization and Theft of Service issues
- ◆ Tight Coupling Between Call Signaling And QoS Control
 - Prevent Call Defects: don't ring the phone if resources are unavailable
 - Prevent Theft Of Service: associate usage recording and resource allocation, ensuring non-repudiation
 - » provide the ability to bill for usage, without trusting end-points
 - » ensure quality requirements for service are met (e.g., don't clip "Hello")
- ◆ Care taken to ensure untrusted end-points behave as desired
- ◆ Privacy mechanisms built into architecture

DCS Architecture

- ◆ Makes use of end-point intelligence
 - useful from the point of view of new feature creation
- ◆ Distribution of state
 - Clients keep Call State
 - Edge Routers keep Connection State
 - DCS-Proxy only keeps Transaction State
- ◆ Failure model minimizes service impacts due to component outages

DCS Architecture




Call State

Connection State


Transaction State

Example Call Flow




- ◆ MTA issues an INVITE to destination E.164 (or other) address
 - don't know yet “what” resources are needed to “where”
 - provider may choose to block a call if resources are unavailable
 - » but $P(\text{blocking})$ may be $\geq P(\text{call defect})$
 - ⇒ call defect: when the call fails after the parties are notified
- ◆ Originating DCS-proxy performs authentication and authorization
- ◆ Terminating DCS-proxy translates dest. number to local IP address

Example Call Flow (contd...)




- ◆ 200 OK communicates call parameters and gate identity to MTA
- ◆ Gate controllers setup “gates” at edge routers as part of call setup
 - gate is described as an “envelope” of possible reservations issued by MTA
 - gate permits reservation for this call to be admitted
- ◆ Policy may be exercised either at Gate controller or associated policy server

Resource Management: 1st Phase



- ◆ MTA initiates resource reservation
 - access resources are “reserved” after an admission control check
 - » this insures that resources are available when terminating MTA rings
 - backbone resources are “reserved” (e.g., explicit reservation or “packet marking”)
- ◆ Originating MTA starts end-to-end handshake with terminating MTA
 - originating MTA sends INVITE(ring), terminating MTA sends 180 RINGING, 200 OK

Resource Management: 2nd Phase



- ◆ MTA knows voice path is established when it receives a 200 OK
- ◆ MTAs initiate resource “commitment”
 - resources “committed” over access channel
 - » CMTS starts sending unsolicited grants; usage recording is started
 - commitment deferred until far end pick up, to prevent theft of service; allow efficient use of constrained resources in access network
- ◆ Commit opens the “gate” for this flow

Signaling Performance Requirements

- ◆ Short post-dial delay
 - no perceptible difference in post-dial delay compared to circuit-switched network
- ◆ Short post-pickup delay
 - delay from when the user picks up a ringing phone and the voice path being cut-through should be small
 - » called party's "hello" must not be clipped
 - » calling party's response to hearing the "hello" must also not be clipped
- ◆ Probability of Blocking: a metric to which provider may engineer net
- ◆ Probability of Call Defect (i.e., call that has both parties invited to and then fails) due to lack of resources needs to be much smaller
 - target rates not necessarily under the control of the provider
- ◆ Flexibility in deployment of DCS-Proxy: start small.

DCS: Profile With Extensions

- ◆ 6 Internet Drafts have been submitted:
- ◆ Architectural Overview
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-arch-00.txt
- ◆ Resource Management And Call Authorization
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-resource-00.txt
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-call-auth-00.txt
- ◆ Privacy
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-privacy-00.txt
- ◆ Proxy-to-Proxy Communications
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-proxy-proxy-00.txt
- ◆ Distributed Call State
 - » draft-dcsgroup-mmusic-state-00.txt