

Network Working Group  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: March 29, 2020

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September 26, 2019

ECC Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Version 1.3  
draft-bruckert-brainpool-for-tls13-07

## Abstract

ECC Brainpool curves were an option for authentication and key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.2, but were deprecated by the IETF for use with TLS version 1.3 because they had little usage. However, these curves have not been shown to have significant cryptographical weaknesses, and there is some interest in using several of these curves in TLS 1.3.

This document provides the necessary protocol mechanisms for using ECC Brainpool curves in TLS 1.3. This approach is not endorsed by the IETF.

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## 1. Introduction

[RFC5639] specifies a new set of elliptic curve groups over finite prime fields for use in cryptographic applications. These groups, denoted as ECC Brainpool curves, were generated in a verifiably pseudo-random way and comply with the security requirements of relevant standards from ISO [ISO1] [ISO2], ANSI [ANSI1], NIST [FIPS], and SecG [SEC2].

[RFC8422] defines the usage of elliptic curves for authentication and key agreement in TLS 1.2 and earlier versions, and [RFC7027] defines the usage of the ECC Brainpool curves for authentication and key exchange in TLS. The latter is applicable to TLS 1.2 and earlier versions, but not to TLS 1.3 that deprecates the ECC Brainpool Curve IDs defined in [RFC7027] due to the lack of widespread deployment. However, there is some interest in using these curves in TLS 1.3.

The negotiation of ECC Brainpool Curves for key exchange in TLS 1.3 according to [RFC8446] requires the definition and assignment of additional NamedGroup IDs. This document provides the necessary definition and assignment of additional SignatureScheme IDs for using three ECC Brainpool Curves from [RFC5639].

This approach is not endorsed by the IETF. Implementers and deployers need to be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of all security mechanisms that they use.

## 2. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

## 3. Brainpool NamedGroup Types

According to [RFC8446], the "supported\_groups" extension is used for the negotiation of Diffie-Hellman groups and elliptic curve groups for key exchange during a handshake starting a new TLS session. This document adds new named groups for three elliptic curves defined in [RFC5639] to the "supported\_groups" extension as follows.

```
enum {
    brainpoolP256r1tls13(31),
    brainpoolP384r1tls13(32),
    brainpoolP512r1tls13(33)
} NamedGroup;
```

The encoding of ECDHE parameters for sec256r1, secp384r1, and secp521r1 as defined in section 4.2.8.2 of [RFC8446] also applies to this document.

Test vectors for a Diffie-Hellman key exchange using these elliptic curves are provided in Appendix A.

## 4. Brainpool SignatureScheme Types

According to [RFC8446], the name space SignatureScheme is used for the negotiation of elliptic curve groups for authentication via the "signature\_algorithms" extension. Besides, it is required to specify the hash function that is used to hash the message before signing. This document adds new SignatureScheme types for three elliptic curves defined in [RFC5639] as follows.

```
enum {
    ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1tls13_sha256(0x081A),
    ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1tls13_sha384(0x081B),
    ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1tls13_sha512(0x081C)
} SignatureScheme;
```

## 5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to update the references for the ECC Brainpool curves listed in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters registry "TLS Supported Groups" [IANA-TLS] to this document.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Recommended	Reference
31	brainpoolP256r1tls13	Y	N	This doc
32	brainpoolP384r1tls13	Y	N	This doc
33	brainpoolP512r1tls13	Y	N	This doc

Table 1

IANA is requested to update the references for the ECC Brainpool curves in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters registry "TLS SignatureScheme" [IANA-TLS] to this document.

Value	Description	DTLS-OK	Recommended	Reference
0x081A	ecdsa_brainpoolP256r1tls13_sha256	Y	N	This doc
0x081B	ecdsa_brainpoolP384r1tls13_sha384	Y	N	This doc
0x081C	ecdsa_brainpoolP512r1tls13_sha512	Y	N	This doc

Table 2

## 6. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC8446] apply accordingly.

The confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the TLS communication is limited by the weakest cryptographic primitive applied. In order to achieve a maximum security level when using one of the elliptic curves from Table 1 for key exchange and / or one of the signature algorithms from Table 2 for authentication in TLS, the key derivation function, the algorithms and key lengths of symmetric encryption and message authentication as well as the algorithm, bit

length and hash function used for signature generation should be chosen at commensurate strengths, for example according to the recommendations of [NIST800-57] and [RFC5639]. Furthermore, the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be generated from a random keystream with a length equal to the length of the order of the group  $E(\text{GF}(p))$  defined in [RFC5639]. The value of the private Diffie-Hellman keys should be less than the order of the group  $E(\text{GF}(p))$ .

When using ECDHE key agreement with the curves brainpoolP256r1tls13, brainpoolP384r1tls13 or brainpoolP512r1tls13, the peers MUST validate each other's public value  $Q$  by ensuring that the point is a valid point on the elliptic curve. If this check is not conducted, an attacker can force the key exchange into a small subgroup, and the resulting shared secret can be guessed with significantly less effort.

Implementations of elliptic curve cryptography for TLS may be susceptible to side-channel attacks. Particular care should be taken for implementations that internally transform curve points to points on the corresponding "twisted curve", using the map  $(x', y') = (x \cdot Z^2, y \cdot Z^3)$  with the coefficient  $Z$  specified for that curve in [RFC5639], in order to take advantage of an efficient arithmetic based on the twisted curve's special parameters ( $A = -3$ ): although the twisted curve itself offers the same level of security as the corresponding random curve (through mathematical equivalence), arithmetic based on small curve parameters may be harder to protect against side-channel attacks. General guidance on resistance of elliptic curve cryptography implementations against side-channel-attacks is given in [BSI1] and [HVM].

## 7. References

### 7.1. Normative References

#### [IANA-TLS]

Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Parameters",  
<<http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xml>>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC5639] Lochter, M. and J. Merkle, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation", RFC 5639, March 2010.

- [RFC7027] Merkle, J. and M. Lochter, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Curves for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7027, DOI 10.17487/RFC7027, October 2013, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7027>>.
- [RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422, DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>>.
- [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>>.

## 7.2. Informative References

- [ANSI1] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI X9.62, 2005.
- [BSI1] Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, "Minimum Requirements for Evaluating Side-Channel Attack Resistance of Elliptic Curve Implementations", July 2011.
- [FIPS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, December 1998.
- [HNV] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.
- [ISO1] International Organization for Standardization, "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.
- [ISO2] International Organization for Standardization, "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves - Part 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.
- [NIST800-57] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General (Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, January 2016.

- [SEC1] Certicom Research, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 1, September 2000.
- [SEC2] Certicom Research, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 2, September 2000.

## Appendix A. Test Vectors

This non-normative Appendix provides some test vectors for example Diffie-Hellman key exchanges using each of the curves defined in Table 1. In all of the following sections the following notation is used:

$d_A$ : the secret key of party A

$x_{qA}$ : the x-coordinate of the public key of party A

$y_{qA}$ : the y-coordinate of the public key of party A

$d_B$ : the secret key of party B

$x_{qB}$ : the x-coordinate of the public key of party B

$y_{qB}$ : the y-coordinate of the public key of party B

$x_Z$ : the x-coordinate of the shared secret that results from completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation, i.e. the hex representation of the pre-master secret

$y_Z$ : the y-coordinate of the shared secret that results from completion of the Diffie-Hellman computation

The field elements  $x_{qA}$ ,  $y_{qA}$ ,  $x_{qB}$ ,  $y_{qB}$ ,  $x_Z$ ,  $y_Z$  are represented as hexadecimal values using the FieldElement-to-OctetString conversion method specified in [SEC1].

## A.1. 256 Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP256r1

$d_A =$

81DB1EE100150FF2EA338D708271BE38300CB54241D79950F77B063039804F1D

$x_{qA} =$

44106E913F92BC02A1705D9953A8414DB95E1AAA49E81D9E85F929A8E3100BE5

$y_{qA} =$

8AB4846F11CACCB73CE49CBDD120F5A900A69FD32C272223F789EF10EB089BDC

$d_B =$

55E40BC41E37E3E2AD25C3C6654511FFA8474A91A0032087593852D3E7D76BD3

$x_{qB} =$

8D2D688C6CF93E1160AD04CC4429117DC2C41825E1E9FCA0ADDD34E6F1B39F7B



y\_qB =  
990C57520812BE512641E47034832106BC7D3E8DD0E4C7F1136D7006547CEC6A

x\_Z =  
89AFC39D41D3B327814B80940B042590F96556EC91E6AE7939BCE31F3A18BF2B

y\_Z =  
49C27868F4ECA2179BFD7D59B1E3BF34C1DBDE61AE12931648F43E59632504DE

## A.2. 384 Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP384r1

dA = 1E20F5E048A5886F1F157C74E91BDE2B98C8B52D58E5003D57053FC4B0BD6  
5D6F15EB5D1EE1610DF870795143627D042

x\_qA = 68B665DD91C195800650CDD363C625F4E742E8134667B767B1B47679358  
8F885AB698C852D4A6E77A252D6380FCAF068

y\_qA = 55BC91A39C9EC01DEE36017B7D673A931236D2F1F5C83942D049E3FA206  
07493E0D038FF2FD30C2AB67D15C85F7FAA59

dB = 032640BC6003C59260F7250C3DB58CE647F98E1260ACCE4ACDA3DD869F74E  
01F8BA5E0324309DB6A9831497ABAC96670

x\_qB = 4D44326F269A597A5B58BBA565DA5556ED7FD9A8A9EB76C25F46DB69D19  
DC8CE6AD18E404B15738B2086DF37E71D1EB4

y\_qB = 62D692136DE56CBE93BF5FA3188EF58BC8A3A0EC6C1E151A21038A42E91  
85329B5B275903D192F8D4E1F32FE9CC78C48

x\_Z = 0BD9D3A7EA0B3D519D09D8E48D0785FB744A6B355E6304BC51C229FBBCE2  
39BBADF6403715C35D4FB2A5444F575D4F42

y\_Z = 0DF213417EBE4D8E40A5F76F66C56470C489A3478D146DECF6DF0D94BAE9  
E598157290F8756066975F1DB34B2324B7BD

## A.3. 512 Bit Curve

Curve brainpoolP512r1

dA = 16302FF0DBBB5A8D733DAB7141C1B45ACBC8715939677F6A56850A38BD87B  
D59B09E80279609FF333EB9D4C061231FB26F92EEB04982A5F1D1764CAD5766542  
2

x\_qA = 0A420517E406AAC0ACDCE90FCD71487718D3B953EFD7FBEC5F7F27E28C6  
149999397E91E029E06457DB2D3E640668B392C2A7E737A7F0BF04436D11640FD0  
9FD

y\_qA = 72E6882E8DB28AAD36237CD25D580DB23783961C8DC52DFA2EC138AD472  
A0FCEF3887CF62B623B2A87DE5C588301EA3E5FC269B373B60724F5E82A6AD147F  
DE7

dB = 230E18E1BCC88A362FA54E4EA3902009292F7F8033624FD471B5D8ACE49D1  
2CFABBC19963DAB8E2F1EBA00BFFB29E4D72D13F2224562F405CB80503666B2542  
9

x\_qB = 9D45F66DE5D67E2E6DB6E93A59CE0BB48106097FF78A081DE781CDB31FC  
E8CCBAAEA8DD4320C4119F1E9CD437A2EAB3731FA9668AB268D871DEDA55A54731  
99F

y\_qB = 2FDC313095BCDD5FB3A91636F07A959C8E86B5636A1E930E8396049CB48  
1961D365CC11453A06C719835475B12CB52FC3C383BCE35E27EF194512B7187628  
5FA

x\_Z = A7927098655F1F9976FA50A9D566865DC530331846381C87256BAF322624  
4B76D36403C024D7BBF0AA0803EAF405D3D24F11A9B5C0BEF679FE1454B21C4CD  
1F

y\_Z = 7DB71C3DEF63212841C463E881BDCF055523BD368240E6C3143BD8DEF8B3  
B3223B95E0F53082FF5E412F4222537A43DF1C6D25729DDB51620A832BE6A26680  
A2

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